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This study is one of a series of sectoral studies on the evolu-
tion of concentration in the Member States of the European 
Community. 
The studies are compiled by the national institutes and special-
ists engaged by the Commission to carry out the sectoral studies 
programme. 
In view of their specific and general interest and pursuant to 
an undertaking given by the Commission to the European Parliament, 
the studies are published unabridged in the original language. 
The Commission adds no commentary; the views and information 
presented are the responsibility of the author alone. 
Other studies under the sectoral research programme will be pub-
lished by the Commission as they are received. - 1 -
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Introduction: Outline of the theoretical approach applied
1' 
Competition is a dynamic process characterized by a continuous 
sequence of what J.M. CLARK terms "moves and responses". This 
dynamic competitive process represents an anonymous control and 
guidance mechanism with financial sanctions. Pioneer profits 
from a temporary lead on the market are both the result and a 
condition of effective competition; they should not be squeezed 
immediately but should be made to disappear only gradually, 
giving the entrepreneur the incentive of a period during which 
his initiative is not curbed. The speed at which pioneer profits 
of any kind are eroded is used as a basis for determining the in-
tensity of competition. However, this concept of competition 
theory, with its focus on market performance, is not easy to 
apply in practice. 
Market imperfections in the shape of product heterogeneity, lack 
of transparency, inadequate foresight, time lags in the speed of 
adjustment, etc. are both the result and a condition of enter-
prising competitive behaviour; according to the dynamic theory of 
effective competition, market imperfections or monopolistic 
elements (i.e. departures from the model conditions for perfect 
competition) are therefore necessary for competition to be effec-
tive. The central problem of the theory of effective competition 
is to distinguish from the competition policy angle between 
desirable and undesirable market imperfections and thereby to 
establish the pattern or patterns of factors of imperfection that 
are to be regarded as a necessary and/or sufficient condition 
for competition to be effective. 
Effective competition is defined and measured by reference to 
structural, behavioural and market performance characteristics; 
in most cases, a combination of structural and behavioural 
characteristics ("market-process definition") is used similar to 
that advocated by KAYSEN and TURNER in their classic work on 
See Ingo SCHMIDT, Wettbewerbstheorie und -politik. Eine Ein-
führung, Stuttgart, 1981, Parts 1 and 2, with further biblio-
graphical references. - 4 
antitrust policy: 
"Antitrust policy, however, cannot operate directly either 
on performance or on processes: we cannot conceive of an 
effective order which says, be efficient or, be competitive. 
Rather, policy operates directly on market structure and on 
firm conduct in order to affect processes and performance." 
Assessing the competitive process by applying a combination of 
structural and behavioural criteria has become the generally 
accepted practice in US, German and Community antitrust policy; 
greater emphasis is placed on the structural approach (e.g. for 
merger control) or on the behavioural approach (e.g. when deal-
ing with predatory conduct) , depending on the rationale of the 
2) 
individual legal provision concerned. Market performance 
criteria are not normally used for measuring effective competi-
tion, first because they are not sufficiently operational and 
second because measures that directly influence performance are 
not sufficiently consistent with the principles of a free econo-
my and a free society. 
In the interests of compatibility with competition policy and 
competition law, it is therefore proposed that effective compe-
tition be equated with the absence of unreasonable market power, 
defined by reference to structural and behavioural characteristics; 
'carl KAYSEN and Donald F. TURNER, Antitrust Policy. An Econo-
mic and Legal Analysis, Cambridge, Mass., 1959, p. 59. 
2)  'KAYSEN and TURNER (op. cit., p. 75) say the following about the 
the relationship between the structural and behavioural 
approach: " A firm possesses market power when it can behave 
persistently in a manner different from the behaviour that a 
competitive market would enforce on a firm facing otherwise 
similar cost and demand conditions. When the "can" in this 
definition is emphasized, we see that the concept of market 
power is basically a structural concept." 
3) 
Joe S. BAIN, Industrial Organization, 2d ed., New York, London, 
Sydney, 1968, pp. 498 et sea, refer to a severe restriction 
of the means for pursuing the objectives set:"This restriction 
is that ... it should be sought in the main through devices 
that foster and maintain impersonal market processes as the 
main direct regulators of enterprise activity ... Departing 
from the axiom, it may be argued substantively that impersonal 
regulation by the market is preferable to extensive bureau-
cratic regulation by men, and more consistent with our demo-
cratic political system." 5 -
these characteristics are investigated by the market structure 
and market conduct tests. Market power can be exercised either 
by single firms holding a dominant position or at least enjoying 
extensive room for manoeuvre vis-a-vis their competitors, or by 
groups of firms (through tight oligopolies, which are character-
ized by a high degree, of interdependence, or through collective 
monopolies based on restrictive agreements). Limiting or con-
trolling the market power of such firms is one of the main tasks 
of competition policy. 
The market structure test is concerned with the number of sellers 
and buyers and their market shares (market monopoly), the degree 
of homogeneity and market transparency and hence the speed of 
response to changes in the market situation, the market phase, 
the type of entrepreneur, the degree of capacity utilization and 
of integration , and other so-called conditioning factors. The 
market conduct test examines whether and to what extent the 
various parameters of action are applied over time, whether they 
are applied individually or collectively at one and the same time 
(conscious parallelism) and whether such competitive conduct 
presents buyers with alternatives. 
It follows from this brief description of the design of the con-
cept of effective competition that competition, in addition to 
being a function of the number of sellers, also depends on a 
fairly large number of characteristics investigated by the 
market structure test ("conditioning factors") and on actual 
market conduct. In this study on the suitability of concentra-
tion measures for competition policy a relationship is none the 
less seen between the market morphology factor and the intensity 
of competition, because: 
Owing to existing integration, the level of concentration 
derived from industry statistics is in most cases too low. - In an examination of whether or not effective competition 
exists, morphology carries a special weight among the con-
ditioning factors (theoretical justification); 
- Morphology is that conditioning factor which, as regards its 
operational and justiciable aspects can most easily be in-
fluenced by competition policy and therefore represents the 
most obvious basis for approaching competition policy (policy 
justification). 
Part I below discusses the importance of the level of concen-
tration for competitive policy. It is essential, however, to 
bear in mind the difference that delimitation of the relevant 
market can make: a very broad definition produces very low 
levels of concentration, while a very narrow definition inevi-
tably results in very high levels of concentration. 
I. A critical level of concentration and the threat to 
2)  effective competition 
1. The importance of the level of concentration for competition 
(i) Before investigating the relationships between the level 
of concentration and the effectiveness of competition, we must 
try to establish whether there is an optimum market structure 
in the narrow sense of the term (= market morphology) that par-
ticularly favours attainment of the traditional objectives of 
income, performance-linked income distribution, optimum allocation 
of factors of production and technological progress in pro-
duction and production methods. Specialist literature suggests 
four possible forms of optimum market structure: 
- older literature (e.g. neo-classical and German neo-liberal) 
1) 
2) 
The Commission Decision in Continental Can, which the Court 
of Justice endorsed at least where the principle was concerned 
must therefore be seen as a step in the right direction 
(restoration of competitive structures). 
See the summary by Hartwig BARTLING, Leitbilder der Wettbe-
werbspolitik, Munich, 1980, pp. 117-125, and Herbert SCHMID-
BAUER, Allokation, technischer Fortschritt und Wettbewerbs-
politik, Tübingen, 1974, pp. 154-197. - regarded polypoly as the optimum form; 
- ALMARIN FHILLIPS and KANTZENBACH consider loose oligopoly, 
characterized by a moderate degree of interdependence between 
2)  firms, to be the optimum market form; 
- SCHUMPETER, SALIN and others have described tight oligopoly 
(monopoly broadly defined) as the optimum form; 
- HAYEK and ΗΟΡΡΜΑΝΝ take the view that, being process of dis-
4)  covery, competition does not have any optimum market form. 
The KANTZENBACH/HOPPMANN controversy ' produced broad agreement 
on the idea that an optimum market structure with fostered com-
petitive conduct and competitive performance while making allow-
ance for any conflicts between the objectives of maintaining 
effective competition and achieving economies of scale in the 






See Walter EUCKEN, Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, 8th ed., 
Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 1965. 
See ALMARIN PHILLIPS, Market Structure, Organization and Per-
formance, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, and Erhard KANTZENBACH, Die 
Funktionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs, 2nd ed., Göttingen, 1967. 
See Edgar SALIN, "Soziologische Aspekte der Konzentration", 
Die Konzentration in der Wirtschaft, edited by F. NEUMARK, 
Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Vol.22, Berlin, 1961, 
pp. 16-44, and Joseph A. SCHUMPETER, Capitalism, Socialism, 
and Democracy, New York, 1942. 
See F.A. VON HAYEK, "Der Wettbewerb als Entdeckungsverfahren", 
Freiburger Studien, Tübingen, 1969, pp. 249 et seq., and Erich 
HOPPMANN, "Das Konzept des wirksamen Preiswettbewerbs", Recht 
und Staat in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Issue 484/485, Tübingen, 
1978, pp. 15-20. 
See Erhard KANTZENBACH, op.cit., Erich HOPPMANN, "Das Konzept 
der optimalen Wettbewerbsintensität", Jahrbücher für National-
ökonomie und Statistik, Vol. 179 (1966), pp. 286-323; Erhard 
KANTZENBACH, "Das Konzept der optimalen Wettbewerbsintensität -
Eine Erwiderung auf den gleichnamigen Besprechungsaufsatz von 
Erich HOPPMANN", Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 
Vol. 181 (1967), pp. 193-241, and Erich HOPPMANN, "Die Funk-
ionsfähigkeit des Wettbewerbs - Bemerkungen zu Kantzenbachs 
Erwiderung", Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik, 
Vol. 181 (1967), pp. 251-264. poly. But the controversy also produced broad agreement on the 
thesis that, typically, the dividing line between a competitive 
and a non-competitive structure lies between loose oligopoly and 
tight oligopoly, the latter being characterized by a very high 
degree of parametric interdependence or mutual reaction that does 
not normally leave room for individual competitive conduct. 
(2) However, the distinction made between competitive polypoly 
and competitive loose oligopoly, on the one hand and non-compe-
titive tight oligopoly on the other must not be interpreted to 
mean that competition is merely a function of the number of 
sellers or buyers. This recognition is already reflected in the 
definition of oligopoly, which, departing from the literal mean-
ing (oligopoly = few sellers) no longer focuses solely on the 
number of suppliers but also on the existence of a more or less 
high degree of interdependence or mutual reaction; this is deter-
mined by the other structural characteristics as well as by 
morphology. The influence of these structural characteristics 
(the so-called conditioning factors) may therefore mean that com-
petition exists even where there is a high level of concentration 
(e.g. duopoly on an expanding market) or that it does not exist 
despite a very low level of concentration (take, for example, the 
polypolistic markets for doctors and dentists, who do not compete 
against one another because of an acute sense of status and the 
consequent absence of a spirit of competition). Consequently, 
a link can be said to exist between the level of concentration 
and the effectiveness of competition only to the extent that 
competition is threatened as concentration increases. This for-
mulation also covers the possibility of distortion in individual 
cases and focuses only on typical links which, in addition, vary 
with the branch structure. Under price and competition theory, 
the significance of a rise in the level of concentration there-
fore lies in the danger which it poses of an increasing symmetry 
of interests, prompting economic agents to modify their objectives 
and behaviour. Empirical studies and theoretical analysis reveal that, from a specified level of concentration, firms find it 
advantageous to pursue joint profit maximization rather than indi-
vidual profit maximization as usually assumed in price theory. 
There is therefore the danger that, above a specified level of 
concentration, firms may change their objectives and pursue a 
joint pricing policy on the basis of a quasi-agreement involving 
either contract-like obligations falling within Article 85 of the 
EEC Treaty or actual parallelism of action based on group disci-
pline or price leadership and falling within Article 86 of the 
EEC Treaty. Any further rise in the level of concentration creates 
a dominant position for a single firm which has wide room for 
manoeuvre vis-a-vis its competitors and is no longer controlled 
by effective competition, the ultimate stage being partial mono-
poly or complete monopoly. However, the main problem for competi-
tion policy today is not dominant positions held by individual 
firms, but those held by groups of firms which jointly control 
the market. 
Even though the scope for a joint pricing policy of this kind also 
depends on other factors such as the degree of homogeneity, trans-
parency or the market phase, the level of concentration is a 
major incentive for the pursuit of such a policy. KAYSEN and 
D For the objective of joint profit maximization through a joint 
pricing policy, see in particular William FELLNER, Competition 
among the Few, New York, 1949. According to this concept, 
oligopolists seek to maximize profits jointly by fixing a 
(joint) "monopoly price" and by selling the "monopoly quantity" 
jointly. The joint profits, which have to be shared out among 
the individual oligopolists (problem of distribution), are 
greater than the sum of the individual profits earned through 
individual profit maximization. 
FELLNER, however, qualifies the pure principle of joint profit 
maximization by allowing for long-term objectives and for the 
desire to avoid uncertainty, factors which in his view prevent 
suppliers from fully exploiting the oligopoly situation. 10 
TURNER put this as follows: ' 
"To be sure, factors other than the size and character of 
the rival firms are important in determining the way on 
oligopolistic market functions - the nature of the product, 
the technological maturity of the industry, the rate of*, 
growth of demand, the cyclical stability of demand, are all 
important. Eut within the framework defined by a given set 
of values of these variables, the larger the number of rival 
sellers and the smaller the relative size of the largest few, 
the more likely will it be that no firm and no group exer-
cises much market power." 
in view of the influence of the other conditioning factors, the 
"critical" level of concentration therefore varies upwards or 
downwards. If we take, say, eight firms operating on a transparent 
and stagnating market for homogenous products, it is highly like-
ly that, because of the high degree of interdependence, we will 
have a tight oligopoly and hence a joint pricing policy as des-
cribed above. If, however, we have the same number of suppliers 
offering relatively heterogenous products on a non-transparent 
expanding market, the firms will be only partly interdependent 
and the situation will be loose oligopoly with presumably effect-
ive competition. 
These considerations modify the findings on the relationship 
between effective competition and the level of concentration: 
in our example with eight firms competition, although threatened, 
is not in itself eliminated. 
These theoretical considerations, which suggest that competition 
is threatened as concentration increases, have been tested empir-
ically. The studies available (those carried out by BAIN, MANN 
and WEISS, for example) use only the concentration ratio CR, 
2)  which is the simplest measure of concentration. 
D 
2) 
KAYSEN and TURNER, op. cit., p. 115; William G. SHEPHERD (The 
Treatment of Market Power. Antitrust, Regulation and Public 
Enterprise, New York and London, 1975) comments as follows on 
the significance of market share for the market structure 
test: "Market share is probably the central element in market 
structure. Barriers and the oligopoly group are probably 
secondary." (Chapter 2, p. 61). 
For a discussion of adequate concentration measures from the 
angle of competition theory, see F.M. SCHERER, Industrial 
Market Structure and Economic Performance, 2nd ed., Chicago, 
1980, pp. 56-64. 11 
This one-dimensional measure indicates the share of sales (the 
most commonly used variable) of the k largest firms in a parti-
cular branch of industry. 
The following summary of the findings of the empirical studies 
will show whether the concentration ratio CR is an adequate 
measure of horizontal market power for the purposes of competition 
policy. 
2. Use of concentration ratios and their implications in compe-
tition theory 
(1) The concentration ratio CR has been used in a large number 
of investigations into a possible causal relationship between 
market structure and market performance. These investigations 
were undertaken to identify the market shares of the k largest 
enterprises that result in non-competitive market structures, 
i.e. to establish whether once market shares had reached a speci-
fied size, competitors engaged in spontaneous coordination and 
conscious parallelism (e.g. over price increases) with the result 
that group discipline stopped any competitive initiative. The 
investigations started from the test hypothesis that there is a 
positive correlation between the concentration ratio and profits, 
in other words that, as market power increases, the level of 
branch profits increases. Various investigations of this kind 
have been conducted over the last thirty years. 
(2) In a pioneering study conducted in 1951 and covering the 
period 1936-1940, BAIN looked at 42 industries and in all 235 
firms in an attempt to identify this correlation. Although a 
positive relationship was seen to exist between the concentration 
See Joe S. BAIN, "Relation of Profit Rate to Industry", The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 65 (1951), pp. 293-324. - 12 -
ratio and average profit rate, the simple correlation coeffi-
cient was only 0.28. When BAIN then split the industries into 
two homogenous groups, he found that there was a critical concen-
tration ratio above which average profit rates were significantly 
higher and below which they were significantly lower (dichotomy 
thesis). The dividing line between the two groups was a market 
share of around 70% for the eight largest firms in each industry. 
In other words, from an eight-firm concentration ratio of 70%, 
poligopolistic interdependence leads to non-competitive behaviour 
with behaviour patterns between the competitors on a particular 
2) 
market changing abruptly rather than gradually. .Such non-competi-
tive behaviour takes the shape of explicit or tacit cooperation 
between the firms concerned which enables them to fix prices, gives 
them room for manoeuvre on the price-cost front and, above all, 
makes it possible for them to raise profit rates from a competitive 
3)  to a monopolistic level. 
BAIN discovered that the average profit rate in industries where 
the eight largest firms accounted for over 70% of output was 11.7% 
compared with only 7.7% elsewhere. In a second study covering 
the period 1948-51, he came to the conclusion that the same general 
correlation between the concentration ratio and profit rates was 





BAIN was concerned with possible relationships between the 
concentration ratio and the average profit rate in specific 
industries. His focus was fundamentally different from that 
of the Commission in the Sixth Report on Competition Policy 
(covering 1976), where the issue was whether, within a speci-
fic branch of industry (e.g. the food industry) small, medium-
sized or large firms were the most profitable. 
See SCHMIDBAUER, op. cit., p. 189. 
See SCHERER, op. cit., Chap. 6: "Conditions Facilitating Oligo-
polistic Coordination" and Chap. 7: "Conditions Limitating 
Oligopolistic Coordination". 
See Joe S. BAIN, Industrial Organization, 2nd ed., New York, 
London, Sydney, 1968, pp. 445-447. 13 
(3) The most comprehensive investigation was by WEISS, who 
in 1974 analysed forty-seven studies carried out in the period 
1936-74 in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
Japan. The studies examined had employed not only the concen-
tration ratios for the eight largest firms but also those of 
the four, twenty and fifty largest firms. In these alternative 
studies with four-firm, eight-firm, twenty-firm and fifty-firm 
concentration ratios, the profits of the fifth to fiftieth largest 
firms did not appear to have any significant effect on the aver-
age profit rate. 
The findings of the empirical studies carried out to date corro-
borate the assumption that profits increase as market power 
increases even though there is no perfect correlation between 
the two, something which cannot be expected in any case since 
there are the other conditioning factors. The so-called criti-
cal level of concentration thus varies in either direction on 
individual markets, and there is no single critical level of 
2)  concentration for all markets. 
(4) It would appear, however, that a critical level of concen-
tration does exist not only for the relationship between concen-
tration and industry profit rate but also for the application of 
technical progress. 
3) 
In 1967 SCHERER investigated the link between the level of con-
centration and technical progress in specific industries. For 
this, he took the number of scientists employed in an industry, 
the number of scientists and engineers, and the average number 
See Leonard W. WEISS, "The Concentration-Profits Relationship 
and Antitrust", Industrial Concentration, the New Learning, ed. 
by Goldschmid, J. Harvey, H. Michael Mann and J. Fred Weston, 
Boston, Toronto, 1974, pp. 184 et seg. 
See also Frederick E. GEITHMAN, Howard P. MARVEL and Leonard 
W. WEISS, "Concentration, Price and Critical Concentration 
Ratios", The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 63 (1981), 
pp. 346 et seg. 
2)  'See also BARTLING, op.cit., p. 123. 
See F.M. SCHERER, "Market Structure and the Employment of 
Scientists and Engineers", American Economic Review, Vol. 57 
(1967), pp. 524-531. - 14 
of those scientists and engineers engaged in R&D as alternative 
indicators of technical progress. He came to the conclusion that 
where a threshold of 50-55% is exceeded, a further increase in the 
concentration ratio (CR.) results in declining employment in R&D. 
He also found that it was only above a concentration ratio (CR.) 
of around 10-14% that any technical or scientific personnel were 
employed at all. He thus identified a lower and an upper threshold 
value. 
(5) These empirical studies attracted a fair amount of criticism. 
The arguments advanced were broadly along the following lines: 
- The concentration ratio is an imperfect instrument for measur-
ing market power because, focusing on market shares alone, it 
disregards other features of market structure. It does not take 
in such factors as the degree of product homogeneity, market 
transparency, barriers to entry and hence potential competition, 
the type of entrepreneur, the scope for inter-firm cooperation, 
interlocking directorates, the degree of capacity utilization 
and the impact of other structural characteristics; 
- In order to apply the concentration ratio (CR, ) , information is 
needed on the market shares of the k largest firms. For this, 
however, the relevant market must first be adequately defined. 
And the broader the definition, the smaller the market shares 
of the firms to be considered; 
D See Christian MARFELS, "Erfassung und Darstellung industrieller 
Konzentration", Wirtschaftsrecht und Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 
52, Baden-Baden, 1977, and Herbert SCHMIDBAUER, Allokation, 
technischer Fortschritt und Wettbewerbspolitik, Tübingen, 1975, 
pp. 154-197. 15 -
Market share is thus established by reference to a particular 
characteristic assumed to reflect correctly the level of con-
centration. The variables most commonly used are sales and 
the number of persons employed. The drawback with sales, how-
ever is that prices are included in such a way that, even with 
the same volume, different levels of sales may be recorded 
because of differing price structures. The number of persons 
employed may give a distorted picture of the extent of concen-
tration in that no distinction is made here between capital-
intensive and labour-intensive production methods; 
The problem with using the concentration ratio in the case of 
conglomerate firms is that the sales figues are for total sales 
of all products, so that sales of products from outside the 
branch in question are included in market shares ; 
The concentration ratio also fails to reflect the extent of 
vertical integration, that is to say control over appropriate 
resources; 
The explanatory value of the concentration ratio also depends 
on the extent to which the dominant firms in a particular 
branch of industry differ structurally from the other firms 
in that industry. The concentration ratio overstates the 
relevant level of concentration where the leading firms export 
relatively more (with a larger share of the domestic market 
being left for the smaller firms), supply their own establish-
ments to a relatively greater extent (double counting) or are 
less specialized than the relevant industry overall; 
Changes over time in the composition of the k largest firms 
do not show up in the concentration ratio. High concentration 
ratios may be recorded for years on end even though the k 
largest firms are constantly changing; 
Lastly, the concentration ratio itself can also be criticized 
on methodological grounds, since the ratio for the k largest 
firms does not tell us anything about the distribution as 
between these k firms and fails to take account of the import-16 
- ance of the "remaining" firms,, that is to say of their number 
and distribution. Only the overall concentration curve would 
provide this information. 
(6) In spite of these shortcomings, the following points in par-
ticular militate in favour of using concentration ratios for de-
picting business concentration: 
- Concentration ratios illustrate in exemplary fashion the size 
of the units in terms of particular variables, with other 
structural characteristics such as the number of other market 
participants, concentration ratios permit a separate assess-
ment of the facts relating to concentration. In summary 
measures of concentration, by contrast, all the structural 
features are intermingled, so cannot be directly assessed for 
the purposes of competition policy; 
- Concentration ratios express primarily the level of concentra-
tion between the largest firms since these are particularly 
important as regards competition policy; 
- Concentration ratios are the measures of concentration most 
commonly used internationally and therefore permit comparisons 
between countries ; 
- Concentration ratios require little statistical material, are 
easy to handle and can be constructed in such a way that they 
have a relatively high information content but do not infringe 
the official rules governing secrecy. 
Concentration ratios for the four or eight largest firms are thus 
used partly for reasons of expediency to do with the statistical 
data available and partly in view of the empirically determined 
threshold values. The distribution both within and outside the 
2)  nucleus must be ascertained using other measures. 
See Monopolkommission, 1. Hauptgutachten 1973/75: Mehr Wett-
bewerb ist möglich, Baden-Baden,1976, para. 152. 
2) See SCHERER, op.cit., pp. 183-186, who analyses number and 
size distribution as important structural dimensions. 17 
(7) In line with the two concepts of market power outlined in 
the introduction, the following criteria should be used when 
attempting to find an adequate concentration measure for identi-
fying, solely on the basis of the morphological factor, market 
structures that are a threat to competition: 
- the market share of the leading firm, the gap between that 
share and the market shares of the remaining firms and the 
distribution of market shares among the latter (disparity); 
- the market share of the nucleus of four or eight leading firms 
and the distribution of their market shares as between them-
selves, and the gap between those shares and the market shares 
of the remaining firms and the distribution of the latter 
(disparity). 
In an exercise of this kind, the impact of the other conditioning 
factors and the criteria of market conduct are disregarded. 
The extent to which competition is threatened must, however, be 
assessed differently, depending on the distribution within the 
nucleus of the four or eight largest firms. The following 
examples illustrate this point: 
- one firm has a 35% market share (dominant) and the other three 
or the other seven each have a share of 5% (CR. or CR respect-
ively; 
- all four firms have a market share of around 12% each or all 
eight firms have a market share of around 9% each (symmetrical 
distribution); 
- four firms have market shares of 20%, 12%, 10% and 8% respect-
ively or eight firms have market shares of 20%, 12% 10%, 8%, 
2x6% and 2x4% respectively (asymmetrical distribution with no 
market dominance). 
Other things being equal, the threat to competition will be 
greater in the first two examples than in the last. - li 
In addition to the distribution of market shares within the 
nucleus, the following must also be ascertained: 
- the rank number of the firm as of which there is a noticeable 
gap between the oligopolistic nucleus and the remaining firms 
(a significant drop in the size distribution); 
- the number of remaining firms and their distribution in the 
light of the influence this so-called competitive fringe exerts 
in partial oligopoly on the nucleus. It can be assumed that 
the more of them there are and the more uniform their size dis-
tribution, the less significant they are for competition 
policy (and vice versa). 
From the viewpoint of competition theory, the purpose of an in-
vestigation into the distribution of market shares outside the 
nucleus is to circumscribe the dominant group of firms, which 
need not always be identical with the four or eight largest firms 
selected for reasons of statistical practicability or on the basis 
of empirically determined threshold values. 
These points will have to be borne in mind when examining the 
suitability of the various concentration measures for detecting 
concentration or critical areas of concentration; in other words, 
in attempting to measure probable (typical) relationships between 
the intensity of competition and the level of concentration, we 
should, if we do have to leave aside the influence of the other 
conditioning factors, take into account all the aspects of the 
morphological factor, i.e. number and disparity; when constructing 
the index. Concentration and disparity may here have opposite 
effects on competition: 
- other things being equal, increasing concentration reduces the 
intensity of competition; 
1) In extreme cases, however, concentration that is increasing in 
a formal mathematical sense may add to the intensity of compe-
tition where, for example, some of the remaining firms combine 
to form a competitive entity; thereby loosening the oligo-
polistic nucleus. This restricts the remaining firms' formal 
room for manoeuvre, but augments their material freedom to 
take decisions. 19 
other things being egual, increasing disparity reduces the 
symmetry of interests (asymmetrical oligopoly) and thus in-
creases the identity of competition; this holds good, however, 
only so long as the disparity does not become such that the 
dominant oligopolistic group develops into a dominant single 
firm. 20 
II. Suitability of various measures of concentration for 
ascertaining concentration and critical areas of 
concentration 1 ) 
1. Statistical measurement of concentration: basic concepts 
2) 
Statistical measures of concentration indicate how the popu-
lation total of a variable (e.g. total sales on a particular 
market) is distributed among the population units (e.g. firms). 
The starting point is the values x. (i = 1, ... n) of a concen-
tration variable (sales) or the relative values p. (market shares) 
of the n units. The classification of the relative shares and 
statistical indicators give or characterize the market morpho-
! 3)  logy. 
A sharp distinction must here be made between disparity and con-
centration. Disparity inequality exists where a small proportion 
of the population units accounts for a large share of the popu-
lation total and the market shares are therefore unevenly dis-
tributed between the units, as in the case of asymmetrical 
distribution within the oligopolistic group or within the com-
petitive fringe. Concentration in the statistical sense occurs 
where, in absolute terms, a few units account for a large pro-
portion of the total value of a variable. Where, for example, 
the four largest firms account for 50% and/or the eight largest 
firms for 70% of the total value of the concentration variable, 
there is said to be a high level of concentration. 
From a statistical point of view, quasi-monopolistic market forms 
and tight oligopolies are regarded as being highly concentrated. 
The definitions,formulae and formal relationships which form 
the basis of this chapter are given in the annex. 
2) 
For a detailed discussion of the statistical measurement of 
concentration, see W. PIESCH, Statistische Konzentrations-
masse, Tübingen, 1975. 
In practice, data are often available for the largest units 
only. In order to obtain significant results, at least 
three quarters of the total value of the variable should be 
investigated. - 21 
Disparity is depicted by a Lorenz curve and concentration by a 
concentration curve. 
For the Lorenz curve, the cumulative proportions of the population 
variable are plotted against the cumulative market shares, the 
summation starting with the smallest unit. It thus gives the 
market shares of the x% (0.<x0<100%) small firms (Fig. 1) . The 
market share of the y% large firms can, of course, also be ascer-
tained. The concentration curve, on the other hand, starts with 
the largest units, with their cumulative number being plotted 
against their cumulative market share. It thus gives the market 
share of the χ largest firms (l<x<n) (Fig. 2). Being the simplest 
measures of concentration, the values indicated by the concentra-
tion curve, i.e. the concentrât i on rati ρ β CR. (e.g. CR 
CRg), play an important role. 










Fig. 1: Lorenz curve for a particular size distribution 
Statistical indices are used to characterize the concentration 
and disparity of a given distribution. Concentration is closely 
related to the disparity and to the total number of the units. 
Given a particular size of population, any measure of concentra-
tion should respond to changes in the disparity by moving in the 
same direction. With constant disparity there should be a change 22 
in the opposite direction when the number of units changes. In 
consequence, concentration is determined by the number of sellers 
and by the inequality in the distribution of market shares. In 
the case of oligopolies, however, it is conceivable that market 
power in particular fields may develop in a direction opposite 
to statistical concentration, i.e. increasing disparity may foster 
competition in an oligopoly. 
In the statistical measurement of concentration, a number of 
extreme distributions are particularly important as borderline 
cases. 
For instance, disparity is lowest in the case of uniform distri-
bution (where all market shares are of equal size) and reaches 
its highest value where one market share is very large (equal to 
1 in the extreme) and where all the others are very small (equal 
to 0 in the extreme). By contrast, concentration is greatest in 
a monopoly, i.e. where one unit has a market share equal to 1. 
The situation of complete non-concentration is not explained. 
In practice, attempts to explain it by introducing a number n for 
the case of uniform distribution between n units have been 
o 
thwarted because of the difficulty of determining n . 
Over the years, specialist literature on the measurement of con-
centration has put forward a multitude of concentration measures, 
certain advantages and disadvantages being ascribed to each of 
them. Describing the concentration of a particular size distri-
bution by means of a single index raises the same problems as 
using mean values or coefficients of dispersion as the sole 
characteristic index of an empirical distribution. For any value 
of a concentration measure, there are always many possible distri-
butions which yield that value if only because of the interaction 
of the disparity effect which may be offset by the number effect. 
For this reason, concentration analysis should rely not only on 23 
an overall measure of concentration characterizing the entire 
distribution, but also on a number of other indices; their values 
can be used to reconstruct the concentration curve at its parti-
cularly interesting front end and yield information on the poten-
tial formation of oligopolies. We will therefore use a number of 
indices, with concentration ratios such as CR = 30%, CR = 50% 
and CR8 = 70% forming the framework; this will be supplemented by 
measures of inequality for the sub-groups of large or small firms 
and by a measure of dominance identifying any nucleus of "large 
firms" (see Fig. 2). Where possible, an index of overall concen-
tration will also be given. 
AC 
Area above concentration 
curve = 
Fig,  Possible path of the concentration curve where there 
is a single dominant firm or an oligopolistic group. 24 -
2. Properties of concentration measures: uniformly standardized 
measures 
Attempts have been made recently to substantiate measures of con-
centration (K) and measures of disparity (D) axiomatically. 
According to Jöhnk , a plausible category of simple concentration 
measures would have the following properties: 
- Standardization : Measures of disparity and of concentration 
should take values in the region ¿0-1/. To make them more 
descriptive, the values can be multiplied by the factor 100 
to yield a range of /O-lOj)/. We use these values for practical 
calculations ; 
- Principle of transfers: A shift from small to large units 
should increase disparity and concentration, while a shift 
2)  from large to small units should have the opposite effect; 
- Proportionality test (replication): If each statistical unit 
is divided into c units of equal size, inequality should not 
be affected, while concentration should decrease by the factor 
1/c; 
- Supplementary test: Supplementing a given distribution with 
units of zero size performs an important function. In practice, 
very small units are incorporated. By adding (c-l)n zero-
size units in an existing distribution of n units, we obtain 
the distribution of en units overall. This should not affect 
3)  concentraion, while disparity should approach its upper limit 




M.D. JOHNK, Eine axiomatisch begründete Methode der Konzentra-
tionsmessung, Institut für Angewandte Statistik der Freien 
Universität Berlin, 1970. 
As explained on pp. 22 et seq.,an increase in inequality may 
foster competition in an oligopoly. 
Where a given distribution is supplemented with small units, 
the larger n and the smaller the market share of a small unit, 
the less concentration is affected. 25 
The principle of transfers is economically meaningful with an eco­
nomic basis, the proportionality and the supplementary tests are 
clear enough and standardization is desirable for practical reasons. 
Measures that possess the properties described and are continuous 
are referred to by JOHNK (1970) as uniformly standardized measures. 
This section and the following are concerned solely with simple 
measures of this kind. For a better understanding of the structure 
of such measures, the measure of disparity is replaced by a counter-
measure, the measure of parity, the sum of the two measures being 
1. The proportionality and the supplementary tests then display 
the following symmetrical properties: in the case of the propor­
tionality test, concentration decreases by the factor 1/c and 
parity remains constant, while the situation is exactly the oppo­
site in the case of the supplementary test, with concentration 
remaining constant and parity decreasing by the factor 1/c. 
A simple relationship is obtained for the measures in guestion : 
the product of the measure of concentration, the measure of parity 
and the number of units is always 1. Thus, with a given number of 
units, there is a clearly-defined measure of disparity for each 
measure of concentration. The impact on concentration of changes 
in disparity and in the number of units can therefore be deter­
mined. 
In the case of standardization, the limits derived are even more 
accurate than required: 
0 < D < 1 - * ,1<K<1 
_ _ η η 
which lie in /0-.1/ for large n. 
A value for the minimum number of units 1/K present can be derived 
from the lower limit for K. This consideration is based on the 
principle of "numbers equivalent". We need to determine how many 26 
firms of equal size would have to be present for there to be a 
given level of concentration. Another requirement imposed on 
concentration measures is concerned with the response to mergers 
and divisions. The measures under consideration react to mergers 
(regarded as transfers with subseguent withdrawal of a zero-sized 
unit) in the same direction: after a merger, concentration always 
increases, while disparity may increase or decrease depending on 
whether the positive transfer effect or negative withdrawal effect 
predominates. 
3. Discussion of special measures of concentration 
(a) Measures that can be derived directly from the concentration 
curve 
The concentration ratios CR., read off the vertical axis of the  ι 
concentration curve, are variables that are statistically easy 
to determine. Where criteria of market structure are applied, 
critical values for the concentration ratios are regarded as 
indicating the existence of market power; these values are CR..= 
50% and CR4= 50-80% in the United States (KAYSEN-TURNER Bill 1959, 
HARRIS Bill 1968/71 and HART Bill 1972/73) and CR.,= 33%, CF,= 50% 
and CR5= 67% in Germany (Section 22(3) of the GWB-Act against 
Restraints of Competition. In order to determine the first con­
centration ratios, information is needed only on truncated partial 
distribution of the largest firms with a given total value of 
the variable. If several concentration ratios, e.g. CR , CR., CR_ 
14 8 
and CR»., are given, the front end of the concentration curve can 
be broadly reconstructed. 
The concentration ratio CR. is a point measure, i.e. we need to 
ι — 
know only a single point along the concentration curve in order 
to calculate it. Calculation of a summary measure takes in all 
market shares p.. Supplying several point measures is, however, 
just as informative as description in the form of a single summary 
measure. 27 
In addition to concentration ratios CR., average concentration 
ratios are also looked at. They give the average market share 
of the i largest firms and can be interpreted as secant slopes 
below the concentration curve. The average market share of the 
remaining smaller firms can similarly be determined. We will 
return to these average values when discussing measures of 
dominance. Lastly, marginal concentration ratios are simply 
the market shares P. themselves. They can be depicted as slopes 
of tangents to the concentration curve. 
(b) Generalized Herfindahl indices 
The best-known and most widely used measures of concentration 
are the generalized Herfindahl indices H : 
i=l 
Depending on the value given to cf, we obtain a special measure of 
concentration : 





Where«!= 3, we obtain a higher-order Herfindahl index which gives 
even heavier weighting to the large units than does H-, with the 
result that the impact of small units in the measure of concen­
tration is even weaker than with H„. 
In the extreme caseo<= 1, we obtain the exponential index, which 
is closely linked to the entropy: 
See G. BRUCKMANN, Einige Bemerkungen zur statistischen Messung 
der Konzentration, Metrika, Vol. 14 (1969), pp. 183-213, and in 
in particular pp. 195 et seg., W. PIESCH, loc. cit., p. 153, 
and L. HANNAH and J.A. KAY, Concentration in Modem Industry, 
London, 1976, pp. 55 et seq. - 28 
η P. 





The larger the value attributed to , the more the corresponding 
Herfindahl index will approach the value of the largest market 
share, which thus represents the upper limit of all generalized 
Herfindahl indices. Herfindahl indices therefore display rela­
tively small values, e.g. in the range of 10-20, even where there 
is considerable concentration. The reason for this is the upper 
limit CR. . Where, CR.. = 50%, for example, no measure of concen­
tration Η can yield values greater than 50. As a result, the 
values for all possible concentrated distributions are clustered 
together in the lower range of /1-100/. The larger the value of 
, the greater the emphasis on the importance of the large firms, 
and in the extreme case only the largest market share will be jtaken 
into account. The Herfindahl index thus gives a heavier weighting 
to large firms than does the exponential index. 
Another measure of concentration is the Rosenbluth index RB, which 
can be defined geometrically by reference to the area above the 
concentration curve A. It is in fact equal to the reciprocal of 
double the area above the concentration curve (see Fig. 2). Hence, 
the greater the curvature of the concentration curve, the greater 
the index will be. It attaches an even smaller weight to large 
firms than the exponential index. The associated measure of in­
equality is the well-known Gini coefficient R, which can be defined 
as being equal to double the concentration area (see Fig. 1). A 
new measure of concentration can be derived from two such measures 
by first taking as the appropriate measure of disparity the 
weighted arithmetic mean of the measure of disparity and then 
calculating the new measure of concentration on the basis of the 
relationship between concentration, disparity and the number of 
units. This establishes a balance between the two underlying 
weighting patterns. As a hybrid that combines aspects of the 
concentration approach (point measure) and Herfindahl indices as - 29 -
summary measures, the Horvath index has acguired some import-
ance; it does not always satisfy the principle of transfers, is 
standardized in an unusual manner and does not satisfy the pro-
portionality test. It is therefore of limited use as a measure 
of concentration. 
(c) Measuring concentration when there is incomplete statistical 
data 
In many cases, the data necessary for carrying out a statistical 
measurement of concentration are incomplete. Frequently, all 
that is available is individual values for the large firms, the 
total number of firms and the total value or individual points 
on the concentration curve. It is therefore important to know 
whether in these cases too concentration can be calculated or 
whether, at least, ranges can be established. 
Taking the statistical data available, an upper limit for any 
measure of concentration, e.g. the Herfindahl index, is obtained 
if, starting from the points given on the concentration curve, 
all possible transfers are made to the largest firms (beginning 
with the largest) while maintaining the convexity of the curve. 
Where only the market shares of the largest firms are known, cal-
culation of the Herfindahl index for this truncated - newly 
standardized - distribution generally produces an unduly rough 
2)  estimate. A lower limit is obtained by assuming the smallest 
possible ineguality and in particular uniform distribution among 
the (unknown) small firms. 
1) 
2) 
See J. HORVATH, "Suggestion for a Comprehensive Measure of 
Concentration", Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 36 (197C)', 
pp. 446-452. 
See the unduly rough estimates made, for example, by C. 
MARFELS, A Study on evolution of concentration in the beverages 
industry in the Federal Republic of Germany, International 
sectoral comparisons including analyses on the beverages in-
dustries in Germany and Europe, Vol. 2, Commission of the 
European Communities, 1979. - 30 
Here are two examples: 
Example 1 
Data available: 
32%, P2 = P3  P,= 6 %  4 




2) ' 100 = 11,32 
Upper limit for the Herfindahl index: 
(P = P  ^ 5 6  = Ρ  12  6 % 
= Ο %) 
13  2 %) 
Ho = (0,32
2 + 11- 0.06
2 + 0,02
2) · 100 = 14,24. 
This yields the range ¿11.32 - 14.24? for the Herfindahl index. 
The Herfindahl index for the truncated distribution of the four 
largest firms is 45.28, too rough an estimation. 
Example 2 
Data available: CR = 50%  CRg = 70% 
The two positions of the concentration curve giving extreme values 
for the Herfindahl index are illustrated in Fig. 3. 
i CR. , C (with Η . ) , C (with Η )  ι min max 
Fig. 2LL Positions of the concentration curve that, with given 
concentration ratios, produce extreme values for the 









4. Problems of aggregation 
Most of the concentration studies carried out on behalf of the 
Commission are country studies and thus focus on national markets. 
To obtain a picture of concentration on the Community market as 
a whole, the country results need to be aggregated. 
Where different firms are active on the market in all countries, 
concentration on the total Community market is always lower than 
the highest level of national concentration and may even be lower 
than the lowest level. Disparity, on the other hand, is always 
greater than the lowest national disparity and may even be greater 
than the highest national disparity. In short, the tendency in 
the event of aggregation is for concentration to decrease and for 
disparity to increase. If complete concentration curves are 
available for all countries and if we know the shares of the total 
market held by the individual countries (expressed in terms of 
the total value), we can construct the concentration curve for 
the aggregate by arranging the newly weighted market shares in 
order. Individual concentration ratios (with the exception of 
CR.. ) cannot, however, be aggregated in this way. 
Similarly, in the case of the simple Herfindahl index and the 
exponential index, to calculate the index for the aggregate from 
one, we need to know only the national index values and the 
national total values. 
Difficulties arise both in calculating the overall indices and 
in estimating them against the individual indices where a firm 
operates on a number of national markets. In addition to the 
aggregation described above, additional calculations concerning 
theoretical mergers have to be performed. These adjustments 
are straightforward in the case of the Herfindahl index and the 
exponential index provided we know the market shares of the firms 
concerned on the individual national markets. The concentration-
reducing effect of aggregation can be mitigated by the merger 
effects that have to be calculated. 32 -
5. Use of measures of dominance"to identify oligopolistic 
nuclei 
With a critical level of concentration of, say; CR. = 50% or 
value for the Herfindahl index ranging from 10 to 20, it is often 
useful to draw a dividing line between a potential group of 
large firms and the remaining smaller firms. A sudden drop of 
this kind in the size distribution is typical of various sorts 
of oligopoly. For a boundary value k a measure of dominance 
gives an index for the "dominance" of the k largest firms over 
the remaining smaller firms. By allowing k to vary and by iden­
tifying the point at which the measure of dominance is greatest, 
we are able to identify a potential oligopolistic nucleus. 
Structurally at least, an oligopolistic group exists where a 
sharp drop occurs at the front end of the size distribution, 
with a few large firms clearly outdistancing the following group 
or the small firms. The oligopolistic group can be easily iden­
tified by describing the drop in the size distribution in terms 
of the relationships χ. , i.e. the slope of the concentration 
curve, and by deter- x. ,, 
k+1 
mining maximum values. This simple slope index D should be 
determined first. 
We would recommend use of two other measures of dominance, which 
can be illustrated with the help of the concentration curve: the 
c 
longest concentration curve chord (D ) - S is here reminiscent 
of the Schutz coefficient, a widely used measure of disparity, 
which is represented by the longest Lorenz curve chord - and the 
Linda dominance D (see Annex). Yet another measure of dominance 
can be derived from the Herfindahl index by classifying the k 
largest firms and the remaining firms into two homogenous groups 
in which the units in each case have the same market share and 
by calculating the (external) Herfindahl index for this situation. 
The limit k , at which this Herfindahl measure of dominance (D ) 
ri 
is greatest, makes a clear line of demarcation between the group 
of large firms and the group of small firms. 33 
Measures of dominance can also be used for truncated distributions. 
As the cut-off line approaches the total number of units, the 
boundaries of the oligipolistic nucleus, identified using a measure 
of dominance, stabilize. 
Following on from Section 6, oligopolistic nuclei will be deter-
mined by way of a small model calculation; the threshold values 
broadly match one another in the case of the measures of dominance 
calculated. 
The following section looks into the suitability for concentra-
tion analyses of the Linda indices, which are used in the EEC 
studies and which are, to some extent, also regarded as measures 
of dominance. 
6. LINDA-Indices 
Since 1972 or thereabouts, the analytical concentration studies 
carried out by or on behalf of the Commission have employed, in 
addition to concentration ratios, a large number of Linda indices. 
The basic building blocks for all Linda indices are the ratios 
of the mean value of a particular variable for the i largest firms 
to the mean value of that variable for the remaining k-i small 
firms. Dominance is the term we use to describe this ratio of 
an "upper mean value" to a "lower mean value"; Linda refers to 
the "ratio of oligopolistic dominance". The measure of dominance 
thus expresses the multiple by which the average of the i largest 
firms is larger than the average of the remaining k-i small 
firms.
1' 
Starting from the correct premises that for the most part infor-
mation is available for the large units only, Linda calculates 
Measures for determining disparity that employ lower and upper 
mean values have been used in Italian statistics for quite 
some time. See. W. PIESCH, loc, cit., pp. 120 et seg. 34 -
two different indices L£ and L, for each cut-off line k = 2, 3, 
... . The mean dominance L* (the simple averaged Linda index) 
is the arithmic mean of all the dominance values (i.e. the arith­
metic mean of all the "ratios of oligopolistic dominance"). It 
represents a formal average of the size proportions of the k 
largest firms. The averaging exercise is a complicated one 
because of multiple counting of the individual values. 
Relating the average dominance L* to the number of firms under 
investigation, we obtain the relative mean dominance L. (the 
κ 
double averaged Linda index). Because of the double averaging, 
L, cannot be graphically meaningfully interpreted. 
In addition, Li and L, are used to construct other Linda indices, 
producing an entire system of Linda indices. 
These indices were used in the EEC studies for measuring concen­
tration and dominance, and in particular for identifying oligo­
polistic nuclei and characterizing various types of oligopoly. 
Let us briefly examine just how useful Linda indices can be in 
resolving such problems. 
The principle of transfers is satisfied by L* and hence by L, . 
An equivalent can be found in the position of the concentration 
curve if k is fixed. Where the concentration curve C lies above 
the concentration curve C without intersecting it, L?l-is greater 
than L*2. L* is very sensitive to any sharp drop in the size 
distribution or to the addition of small units and assumes very 
large values. In the event of mergers, it may fall. Leaving 
aside the unusual standardization of the measure in the case of 
values between 1 and oo, L* always gives the upper limit OO for 
all distributions (1, 1,, 1,0), ... , (1,0, ... , 0) containing 
at least one zero. For this reason, L* and L. are not measures 
of concentration. 35 
L* = 1 in the ease of all uniform distributions. As can be seen 
from the example of distributions (2,1) and (2,2,1,1) and (2,2, 
2,1,1,1) etc., mean dominance decreases steadily starting from 
2 and heads for a value of 1.52. As a result, the proportionali­
ty test is not (exactly) satisfied. Since the supplementary 
test does not apply either, L* and Lk are, strictly speaking, not 
measures of inequality. Nonetheless, an attempt could be made 
to use at least as an approximation mean dominances L* for de-
k 
scribing inequalities. For this, it would be advisable to intro­
duce the transformed mean dominance D = L* - 1 as a sort of un-
restricted measure of inequality. However, the way the index is 
constructed (large firms related to small firms), it produces a 
particularly high value for the lower disparity (compared with 
the Lorenz curve). In particular, the use of traditional measures 
of disparity (e.g. the Gini coefficient or the Schutz coefficient) 
yields assessments different to those yielded by L*-l. These 
K 
objections lose some of their force where the study is restricted 
to dominance in oligopolistic nuclei since these do not contain 
any small firms. The different picture of disparity provided by 
L* is apparent from the following example: 
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R, = 0.44 
. S, = 0.333 
L^UP = 3.603 36 -
We shall also investigate to what extent Linda indices are useful 
as measures of dominance for delimiting oligopolistic nuclei. 
Cut-off lines can be determined by identifying points of maximum 
dominance (e.g. the "ratios of oligopolistic dominance" referred 
to by Linda). The mean dominance L* is not, however, a suitable 
k 
measure for identifying an oligopolistic group since, in most cases, 
it increases steadily. 
The relative mean dominance L, responds to a sharp drop in the 
size distribution in such a way that L, takes on a relative mini-
mum value, 
measure : 
The following are some of the shortcomings of this 
Empirical investigations show that the cut-off line identified 
using L, does not always coincide with the largest drop in the 
size distribution; 
Since L, can be determined only as of k  2, partial monopolies 
are not measured; 
- If a size distribution with a constant ratio x.  _c < 1 
declines, L, points to oligopolistic groups, x. . 
The smaller c, the larger the group of oligopolists; 
In the case of a symmetrical oligopoly and a symmetrical fringe, 
the size distribution consists of k equally large firms (x.. = 
a) and η-k egually small firms (x  k+1 
χ = b)  n 
Here, the size distribution drops at k, and L, should identify 
the oligopolistic group. Assume b = oc. < l and we obtain a cri-
tical value oc ■. for each k (see Table 2) .  L, has a minimum 
value only forocCoc k, and not forofèoC k, i.e. where only a 
small drop is observed in the size distribution. 

















0.70 - 37 
Where k = 2, the Linda index thus does not have a minimum value 
for (10, 10, 6) but does have one for (10, 10, 4). Assuming k = 
4, no nucleus is indicated for (10, 10, 10, 10, 7) whereas one 
is indicated for (10, 10, 10, 10, 5). While such robust behaviour 
of the measure might be desirable, the response moves in the 
wrong direction. With a given value of oc , the looser an oligo­
polistic nucleus, the more readily it will be identified. 
These considerations show that, as a measure for detecting oligo­
polistic groups, L is no better than the slope index or other 
measures of dominance. Until such time as it is evident which 
measures of dominance are particularly well-suited to identifying 
oligopolistic nuclei, we suggest that several measures be used 
alongside one another, including L, . 
7. Model calculations 
Various measures of concentration and of dominance have been 
determined for the following four size distributions of typical 
market structures (see Table 3). 
The results can be interpreted as follows: 
The high concentration ratios of CR. = 36%-50% and CR0 - 70%-72%  a 4 8 
indicate the existence of oligopolistic groups. The size of 
these groups is expressed in terms of the threshold value k. 
obtained using a measure of dominance. As an experiment, the 
measures of dominance D , D and D and the measures D and L 
are used. In distribution 1, depending on the measure of dominance 
chosen, we obtain the threshold values k.= 1 and k.= 8, which 
focus on the partial monopoly and the competitive fringe group. 
In distributions 2 and 4, virtually all the measures identify 
the oligopolistic group correctly at k.= 8. In distribution 3, 
A Η  D , D and L, point to the nucleus (k = 4), and the other measures 
identify the total oligopolistic group (k.= 8). The Linda 
A 
index L, and the slope index D , which yield relative extremes 
Κ 
for k= 4 and kT = 8, reveal interesting behaviour; kT= 8 re-
L L J-i 
presents an absolute extreme. This index therefore identifies 
not only the nucleus but also the oligopolistic group or compe­
titive fringe.  k. stands for one of the threshold values k , k , kH, k or kL> - 38 
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Η = 8.4 
E = 5.1 
CR= 20 
CR.= 50  4 
CRg= 70 
L* = 1.8 



















Dominant firm with competitive fringe. 
Dominance in the remaining group of small firms (beyond eight) 
Position of the maximum values of D
A, D
s, 
the minimum value of the Linda index L, 
than one extreme value, these are shown in brackets. 
D
H and DÛ and of 
Where there is more - 39 -
The measures of dominance L* and L* permit a rough assessment of 
disparities among the four or eight largest firms. Conclusions 
with varying implications for competition policy can in this way 
be drawn regarding the existence of symmetrical or asymmetrical 
oligopolies. Where group interests coincide in the case of 
symmetry, a reduction in the intensity of competition is presumed. 
For this reason, there is no point in indicating the Herfindahl 
index where group power exists since a direct correlation may be 
presumed, at least in certain areas, between statistical concen-
tration and intensity of competition and an inverse correlation 
between statistical concentration and market-power concentration. 
The examples presented should, where possible, be supplemented by 
observations on any inegualities in the remaining group. 
8. Conclusions and results 
The conventional statistical approach to measuring concentration 
starts from the idea of a firm holding a dominant position on 
the market, the so-called individual power concept of competition 
theory. When statistical concentration increases, the intensity 
of competition can then be presumed to decrease and market power 
to increase. In applying this concept, particular importance 
attaches to concentration ratios, to the dependence of concen-
tration on disparity and the number of firms, and to the impact 
of transfers. It is also possible to employ simple summary mea-
sures of concentration such as the Herfindahl index and the 
exponential index. 
A variant of the statistical measurement of concentration is 
needed for the group power concept (involving the existence of 
tight oligopolies characterized by spontaneous conscious paral-
lelism) which has recently come to play a prominent role in com-
petition theory. Where, given a concentration ratio of CR = 50%, 
we have, for example, a symmetrical and an asymmetrical oligopoly, 40 
the distribution of group power in the symmetrical oligopoly 
(no inequality) is presumed to result in a lower intensity of 
competition than in the case of the asymmetrical oligopoly 
(existence of inequality). 
Starting from the concept of group power, it cannot be concluded 
therefore that, at least within certain ranges, an assumed decrease 
in intensity of competition occurs where statistical concentra-
tion increases, since an increase in inequality within an oligo-
poly tends to promote competition. In this case, summary measures 
of statistical concentration are not suitable indicators of in-
tensity of competition and market power. Nonetheless, the con-
centration ratios described can be used to characterize measures 
of inequality for partial distributions and measures of dominance 
for critical market structures, especially those types of oligo-
poly that threaten competition. 
The following indicators should therefore be compiled in order 
to measure and identify such critical market structures: a high 
concentration ratio CR (e.g. greater than 30%) and a low threshold 
value k,= 1 point to the existence of a dominant firm. The in-
equality within the residual group should also be investigated 
using L* ,. .  * r/1 
If CR, = 50% and CRn = 70% and if the threshold value k. yields  4 8
 1 
a small value (k. < 10), the size distribution in question indi-
cates the existence of an oligopolistic group. The indicators 
L* and L* ,. provide further information on dominance in the  k r/k * 
nucleus and in the residual group. 
Where the indicators have such critical values, this indicates 
a threat to competition. Closer investigation of other structural 
characteristics and of market conduct should then make it clear 
whether such a threat actually exists. - 41 
Table 4: Measures of concentration and dominance for identifying 
critical market structures 
Indices 






Threshold values k (size of 
the oligopolistic nucleus) 
Additional indices, if any 
Values 
Herfindahl index H 
(Exponential index E) 
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III. Suitability of the proposed measures of concentration and 
dominance for competition policy investigation based on 
individual cases and empirical studies 
This part looks at the measures of concentration and dominance 
advocated in Part II in terms of their suitability for ascertain-
ing market power. 
We shall use the layout for measuring concentration proposed on 
page 41. The value 10 can be taken as the critical value for 
the Herfindahl index and for the exponential index, 50% for 
CR and 70% for CR_ giving critical ranges for ascertaining in 
the distribution of market shares within a group comprising the 
largest firms is impracticable, since the values of all the 
proposed indices are influenced by group size. It is fair to 
say, however, that, from the viewpoint of competition policy, 
both a very low degree of ineguality - symmetry of interests -
and a very high degree of inequality - marked predominance of 
individual firms - pose a threat. 
1. Examination of Decisions under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty 
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty prohibits "any abuse by one or more 
undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or 
in a substantial part of it ... in so far as it may affect trade 
between Member States". 
The Decisions taken under this Article in Continental Can, 
United Brands (Chiquita) and Hoffmann-La Roche are a particularly 
suitable basis for examining the usefulness for competition policy 
of the proposed measures of concentration and dominance, since 
This corresponds to an oligopoly made up of ten suppliers of 
equal size. Where there are more than ten or twelve oligo-
polists, oligopolistic interdependence and the scope for 
coordinated group behaviour are, generally speaking, sharply 
reduced. See SCHERER, op. cit., pp. 199 et seg. 43 -
most of the other Decisions have been concerned with de facto 
or de iure monopoly situations (CR.. = 100%) 
2)  a) The Continental Can Case 
(1) The facts 
By 1969 Continental Can Company Inc. (Continental) of New York, 
a company operating in the packaging sector, had brought its 
share in Schmalbach-Lubeca-Werke AG (SLW) of Brunswick, Germany, 
up to 85.8% of the nominal capital. Europemballage, the holding 
company for packaging which was set up by Continental in 1970 
and which was to manage all Continental's interests in Europe, 
purchased shares and convertible debentures of Thomassen & 
Drijver-Verblifa NV (TDV) of Deventer, thus bringing Continental's 
share in TDV to 91,07%. 
In december 1971 the Commission found that Continental Can Com-
pany Inc. of New York had abused, within the meaning of Article 
86 of the EEC Treaty, its dominant position on a substantial 
part of the common market for light packaging by the purchase 
made in April 1970 by its subsidiary Europemballage & Co. of 
approximately 80% of the shares and convertible debentures of 
TDV of Deventer, this purchase having the effect of practically 
eliminating competition in the aforementioned packaging on a 
substantial part of the common market. This was the first 
occasion on which the Commission made it clear that the merger 
between a market-dominating firm and its competitor constitutes 
an abuse within the meaning of Article 86 where it restricts 
D 
2) 
See the cases involving GEMA, SABAM, SACEM (de facto) and 
SIAE (de iure). 
Commission Decision of 9 December 1971, OJ No. L 7 of 8 
January 1972, p. 25;_Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental 
Can v. Commission. ¿197.3/ ECR 215. 44 
the freedom of choice of consumers in a manner incompatible 
with the rules of competition laid down in the Treaty. Although 
the Court of Justice endorsed the Commission's legal standpoint 
in February 1973, namely that specific forms of merger or acgui-
sition were also caught by Article 86, it quashed the Decision 
itself on the ground that it contained insufficient evidence 
regarding the delimitation of the relevant market and potential 
competition and hence a strengthening of a dominant position. 
(2) Existence of a dominant position: the Commission's and the 
Court of Justice's arguments 
The Commission's Decision was based on the view that "under-
takings are in a dominant position when they have the power to 
behave independently, which puts them in a position to act with-
out taking into account their competitors, purchasers or suppliers. 
That is the position when, because of their share of the market, 
or of their share of the market combined with the availability 
of technical knowledge, raw materials or capital, they have the 
power to determine prices or to control production or distri-
bution for a significant part of the products in question". 
In Continental Can the Commission considered that the company 
had a dominant position on the market for light metal containers 
for preserved meat and fish and on the market in metal caps for 
glass jars. It also examined possible substitutes for particular 
types of light metal containers and the factors that restrict 
substitutability. It took the view that the dominant position 
of Continental Can derived from the shares accounted for by its 
subsidiary SLW on the various sub-markets for light containers 
and from the group's economic, financial, and technical import-
ance. The substantial market shares on the various sub-markets, 
together with these factors, would, the Commission maintained, 
enable Continental Can to behave independently, giving it a 
dominant position on the market for metal closures. 45 
The Court, however, criticized the Commission's definition of 
market based on the uses of light metal containers and stressed 
that greater account should be taken of production flexibility 
(potential competition): "In order to be regarded as constituting 
a distinct market, the products in question must be individualized 
not only by the mere fact that they are used for packing certain 
products, but by particular characteristics of production which 
make them specifically suitable for this purpose. 
A dominant position on the market for light metal containers for 
meat and fish cannot be decisive as long as it has not been 
proved that competitors from other sectors of the market for light 
metal containers are not in a position to enter this market by a 
simple adaptation, with sufficient adaptation, with sufficient 
strength to create a serious counterweight." 
Since it took a different view of the material definition of the 
relevant market in stressing the need to take account of poten­
tial competitors, the Court ruled that Article 86 was not appli­
cable to this case. 
(3) Testing the measures of concentration and dominance proposed 
in Part II: the Continental Can Case 
In the case in question, the Commission considered that the 
dominant position resulted from large market shares, the group's 
lead over most of its competitors and its size and economic, 
financial and technical importance. An analysis of the three 
relevant markets for light metal containers revealed the follow­
ing individual market shares (= ρ), the relevant geographic 
market being defined as the northern and central parts of West 
Germany and the Benelux countries: 46 
(a) Market for preserved meat: 
- Germany: p1 = 70-80% - Benelux: 
P2 =  10% 
p, = 4.6% 
ρ = 100% 
(b) Market for preserved fish: 
- Germany: ρ = 80-90%  Benelux: p. = 100% 
p3 = 4.6% 
(c) Market for metal closures for glass jars: 
- Germany: ρ = at least 50% - Benelux: p.
 :  at least 45% 
No other information on market shares was supplied; twenty other 
firms of regional importance were active on the Germen market 
for containers for preserved food (meat and fish). 











Mean dominance T *  L3 




50.3 - 65.4 
23 .7 - 48.2 
70.0 - 80.0 
84.6 - 94.6 
85.1 - 99.2 
87.2 - 100 




64,9 - 77.2 
37.9 - 63 .0 
80,0 - 87 4 
92.6 - 100 
92.9 - 100 




1) Since the information available on the structure of market 
shares is not complete, no exact values can be given, particu­
larly for summary measures of concentration, but merely ranges 
within which the (unknown exact) value falls. The methods of 
calculation is explained in Part II. 3(c); for practical 
reasons, we have assumed here that the smallest measurable 
market share is 0.1%. 47 
The concentration analysis may be summarized as follows: 
- The Herfindahl index H is of the order of 60 or 70, suggesting 
a very high level of overall concentration, 
- Continental Can's market share on the different markets is very 
high (70% or 80%, 80% or 100%, and 50% or 45%), 
- On the market for preserved meat and fish, the gap between 
Continental Can and the second-largest firm is so great that 
the threshold value on both markets is k,, = k„ = 1 . 
A H 
- The market shares within the group comprising the three largest 
firms (70%, 10% and 4.6%; 80%, 8% and 4.6%) are very unevenly 
distributed on the market for preserved meat and fish because 
of the high market share of the market leader. L* lies between 
9.1 and 10.4 or between 11.1 and 12.1. 
- Since the remaining market shares are not known, the disparity 
in the remaining group cannot be quantified. 
The high concentration ratios CR and the low threshold values 
of k = k = 1 indicate that Continental Can holds a dominant 
position. The concentration ratios are unable to shed any light 
on the intensity of potential competition from new entrants; 
this would have to be determined as part of a wider analysis of 
market structures. 
2") 
(b) The United Brands (Chiguita) Case 
(1) The facts 
United Brands Company (UBC) is the largest group operating on 
the world banana market. Its European subsidiary, United Brands 
Continental BV (UBC BV), Rotterdam is responsible for coordinating 
Using the Linda index (L, ) would not have yielded any threshold 
value because of the existing partial monopoly (see p. 36). 
2) 
Commission Decision of 17 December 1975, OJ No. L 95 of 9_April 
1976, p. 1; Case 27/76 United Brands vs. Commission ¿197.8/ ECR 
207, 14 February 1978. - 48 
banana marketing in the Member States of the Community, save in 
the United Kingdom and Italy. Following numerous complaints, 
the Commission instituted proceedings against UBC BV in March 
1975 for infringement of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. It 
accused the firm of four types of abuse of its dominant position: 
- ban on the resale of green bananas by independent ripeners/ 
distributors, which had resulted in market segregation, 
- refusal to continue to supply a Danish ripener and distributor 
after the latter had taken part in an advertising campaign 
for bananas of a competing brand, 
- discrimination against trading partners through the application 
of prices which, depending on the Member State in which customers 
customers are established, differ significantly, 
- the charging of unfair prices to some of its customers. 
In 1978 the Court upheld the Commission's Decision with regard 
to the first three types of abuse under Article 86. 
(2) Existence of a dominant position: the Commission's and the 
Court of Justice's arguments 
In its judgment, the Court added some essential elements to the 
concept of dominant position. It considered that a dominant 
position within the meaning of Article 86 was a position of eco-
nomic strength enjoyed by an undertaking "which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant 
market by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately of 
its customers." This definition covers not only cases in which 
a firm's market share is so large that this alone suggests the 
existence of a dominant position but also situations in which 
this position derives from a combination of several factors 
which, taken separately, are not necessarily determinative. 49 
On the matter of UBC's position on the world banana market, the 
Court analysed a series of structural characteristics, stressing 
the firm's very extensive vertical integration (from plantations 
through refrigerator ships to ripeners), its ability to satisfy 
the demand for bananas at any moment, its comprehensive technical 
know-how and its market policy of promoting the Chiquita brand, 
which assured the firm of an unchanging group of customers and 
gave it control over all stages of distribution. 
With regard to the competitive situation on the relevant market 
for bananas, the Court found that a trader can only be in a 
dominant position on the market for a product if he has succeeded 
in winning a large part of that market. It viewed the fact that 
UBC's market share was several times greater than that of its 
nearest competitor and that UBC also enjoyed essential structural 
advantages as the main indication of its dominant position. 
It also held that, in order to establish whether an undertaking 
is in a dominant position, it might be expedient to take account 
of any facts put forward as acts amounting to abuses (abuse as 
an indication of market dominance). In this respect, it drew 
attention to the clause covering the sale of green bananas, 
which gave UBC absolute control over the entire trade in its 
products. The Court considered that it was also typical of a 
dominant position that UBC had completely withstood the extremely 
keen competition which other producers had repeatedly unleashed 
against it, that it had successfully fought the appearance of 
new competitors on the entire relevant market, that it had been 
able to maintain its sales figures on all national markets in 
question and that customers continued to buy bananas from UBC 
even though it charged the highest prices. 50 
( 3) Testing the measures of concentration and dominance proposed 
in Part II: the United Brands Case 
An analysis of the relevant market for bananas revealed the 
following individual market shares (= ρ), the relevant geo­
graphic market being defined as the entire Community market: 
P1 = 40%  P5 = 5% 
p6 = 5%  9% 
6% p7 = 3% 
p8 = 2% 
The market shares of the remaining suppliers were not specified. 
Table 6: Measures of concentration for the United Brands Case 
P4 = 6% 
Indices 













18.2 - 18.6 








* See footnote to Table 5. - 51 
The concentration analysis may be summarized as follows: 
- The Herfindahl index H is of the order of 18, suggesting a very 
high level of overall concentration, 
- UBC's market share is relatively high (40%), 
- the gap between UBC and the next largest firm, which has 9% of 
the market, is so great that the threshold value is k. = k = 1, 
A H 
- the market shares within the group comprising the four and 
eight largest firms are very unevenly distributed because of 
the high market share of the market leader. L* works out at 
4.3 and L* at 5.1, 
o 
- the market shares within the remaining group are relatively 
unevenly distributed; L* cannot be calculated owing to a lack 
of information on the remaining market shares. 
The relatively high concentration ratio of CR = 40% and the low 
threshold value of k„ = kTT = 1 indicate that UBC holds a dominant 
A H 
position. 
(c) The Hoffmann-La Roche Case 
(1) The facts 
In 1976 in a Decision under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty, the 
Commission ruled against Hoffmann-La Roche (Roche) based in 
Switzerland, which heads a multinational group and is the world's 
leading producer of vitamins. 
Roche had agreements with twenty-two customers for the exclusive 
or preferential supply of vitamin preparations. In exchange for 
this exclusivity or as an incentive to establish preferential 
ties, these arrangements provided for discounts in the form of 
a "loyalty rebate". These "loyalty rebates" were granted where 
customers obtained from Roche all or most of their vitamin re-
quirements. They were not calculated separately for the 
Commission Decision of 9 June 1976, OJ No. L 223 of 16 August_ 
1976, p. 27; Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche vs Commission ¿1979./ 
ECR 461. - 52 
individual group of vitamins, but on the basis of the total quan-
tity of all vitamins purchased from Roche ("across-the-board" 
rebate). In this way, Roche secured itself a preferential position 
also on vitamin markets where it was not dominant. 
In the Commission's view, each group of vitamins constituted a 
distinct market because each group was particularly suited to 
satisfy stable requirements and was not, or at least not to any 
significant extent, interchangeable with any other group or with 
any other products. The relevant product markets concerned by the 
Decision were seven groups of vitamins: A, B_, B,, C, E, Biotin 
(H) and pantothenic acid (B,.) . The relevant geographic market 
was the entire common market. 
In 1979 the Court upheld most of the Commission's Decision. 
(2) Existence of a dominant position: the Commission's and the 
Court of Justice's arguments 
The Commission found in its Decision that Roche was, all in all, 
so independent in its conduct on the relevant markets that it 
was able to prevent effective competition within the common 
market and, as a result, held a dominant position on those 
markets; this was apparent in particular from the following: 
- Roche's market share for the different vitamins ranged from 
47% to 95%; its turnover exceeded that of all other manufacturers 
combined, 
- Roche produced a far wider range of vitamins than its compe-
titors, and this enabled Roche to pursue a more independent 
sales and pricing strategy than other manufacturers, 
- Roche enjoyed a technological and commercial lead over its 
competitors, 
- Entry into the vitamins market was made very difficult by the 
fact that substantial investment was needed and capacities 
had to be programmed over long periods. 53 -
In its judgment, the Court acknowledged that the Commission had 
defined the relevant markets correctly in its disputed Decision. 
It took the view that, in determining whether there was a dominant 
position, a substantial market share was s significant indicator; 
other indicators were the relationship between the market share 
of the firm concerned and those of its competitors, the technolo­
gical lead of a firm, a first-class sales network and the absence 
of potential competition. 
These considerations led the Court to look into Roche's shares 
on each of the relevant markets and to examine the indicators 
which, in conjunction with market shares, can prove the existence 
of a dominant position. The Court's analysis of the various 
vitamin groups showed that the conditions for a dominant position 
on the markets of vitamin groups A, B_. Β , , C, E and H were ful­
filled, while no dominant position could be proved on the market 
for vitamin B... 
(3) Testing the measures of concentration and dominance proposed 
in Part II: the Hoffmann-La Roche Case 
(a) Vitamin group A 
An analysis of the relevant market revealed the following indi­














The concentration analysis (see Table 7) may be summarized as 
follows : 
- The Herfindahl index H is 33.1, suggesting a very high level 
of overall concentration, 
- Roche's market share is relatively high (47%), 
- Though the gap between Roche and the next largest firm is re­
latively large, the threshold value is k0 = 2 or kT = 
ri L· - 54 
Table 7: Measures of concentration* for the Hoffmann-La Roche 
Case 
Market: vitamin group A 
Indices 





















* See footnote to Table 5. 
- 3 . The market structure points more to an asymmetrical oligo­
poly than to a partial monopoly on the part of Roche, 
- This asymmetry is apparent from the distribution of market 
shares within the group of the four largest firms. L* works 
out at 3.4, 
- Examination of the remaining group is pointless since there are 
only five suppliers. 
The low threshold values of ktT=2 and k.=3 indicate a tight oligopoly 
π L 
with market leadership by Roche. 
1) A 
Using the slope index D , which expresses the relationship 
of the market share to the next smallest market share, gives 
an even greater threshold value of k. = 4. 55 -
(b) Vitamin group 
An analysis of the relevant market revealed the following indi-
vidual market shares (= p): 
1972  1974 
Pl =
 CR1  P- = 80.6% 
1973 
7.0% p. = 81.2% 
Table 8: Measures of concentration* for the Hoffmann-La Roche 
Case 














65.0 - 68.7 
22.0 - 61.1 
80.6 
1 
* See footnote to Table 5. 
The concentration analysis may be summarized as follows: 
- The Herfindahl index H is of the order of 67, suggesting a very 
high level of overall concentration, 
- Roche's market share is very high (80.6% in 1974), 
- The gap between Roche and the second largest firm is so great 
that the threshold value is k = 1, 
H 
- L* or Li and L* cannot be calculated owing to a lack of further 
4 8 r 
information. 
The very high concentration of Roche (80.6% in 1974) and the low 56 -
threshold value of kT7 = 1 indicate that Roche holds a dominant 
H 
position on the market. 
(c) Vitamin group B- (pantothenic acid) 
An analysis of the relevant market revealed the following indi­
vidual markets shares (= p) of the market leader: 
1972 
P1 = CR = 28.9% 
1973 
ρ = 34.9% 
1974 
Pl = 51.0% 
In 1973, a Japanese importer had a market share of 30%, and the 
Court therefore rightly pointed out that such market shares were 
not in themselves enough to indicate a dominant position. 
(d) Vitamin group B, 1) 
An analysis of the relevant market revealed the following indi­
vidual market shares (= p) 
1972  1973 
ρ = CR = 87.0%  ρ = 90.0% 
1974 
p. = 83.9% 
None of the four next smallest competitors had a market share of 
10%, and the shares of some competitors were probably under 5%. 
Table 9: Measures of concentration* for the Hoffmann-La Roche 
Case 
Market: vitamin group Br (1974) 
b 
Indices 








70.4 - 71.8 
28.4 - 57.8 
83.9 
1 
* See footnote to Table 5. 
D Vitamin B, and biotin (Η) have been bracketed together, since 
they both come under the same customs tariff heading; this 
affects only slightly the market shares for vitamin B.. 57 
The concentration analysis may be summarized as follows: 
- The Herfindahl index H is of the order of 71, suggesting a very 
high level of overall concentration, 
- The market shares of the market leader are very high (83.9% in 
1974), 
- The gap between Roche and the next largest firm is so great that 
the threshold value is k„ = 1, 
H 
- L* or L* and L* cannot be calculated owing to a lack of further 
4 o r 
information. 
The very high concentration ratio of CR., and the low threshold 
value of k = 1 indicate that Roche holds a dominant position. 
(e) Vitamin group C 
An analysis of the relevant market revealed the following indi­
vidual market shares (= p): 
1972 1973 1974 
Px = CR1 = 65.7% ρ = 66.2% ρχ = 64.8% 
p2 = 14.8% 
p3 = 6.0% 
No market shares are specified for other suppliers. 
The concentration analysis (see Table 10) may be summarized as 
follows : 
- The Herfindahl index Η is of the order of 45, suggesting a very 
high level of overall concentration, 
- Roche's market share is relatively high (64.8% in 1974), 
- The gap between Roche and the next largest firm is so great 
that the threshold value is k = k„ = 1, 
A o 
- Market shares among the three largest firms are very unevenly 
distributed because of the high market share of the market 
leader. L* works out a 6.4. Table 10: Measures of concentration* for the Hoffmann-La Roche 
Case 
Market: vitamin group C (1974) 
Indices 




ratios (%) CR 
CR4 
CR8 






44.6 - 45.3 
17.8 - 31.4 
64.8 
85.6 
85.7 - 91.6 




* See footnote to Table 5. 
- Market shares within the remaining group are very small com-
pared with the market leader; in addition, they are relatively 
unevenly distributed, 
- L* or L* and L* cannot be calculated owing to a lack of further 
4 o r 
information. 
The relatively high concentration ratio of CR- = 64.8% and the 
low threshold vakue of k„ = kT, = 1 indicate that Roche holds a 
A H 
dominant position. 
(f) Vitamin group E 
An analysis of the relevant market revealed the following indi-
vidual market shares (= p): 59 
1972 




ρ = 58% 
p2 = 16% 
P3 = 6% 
p4 = 1%  1) 
Table 11: Measures of concentration* for the Hoffmann-La Roche 
Case 
Market: vitamin group E (1974) 
Indices 




ratios (%) CR4 
CR8 






36.6 - 36.8 
11.8 - 18.3 
58.0 
81.0 




* See footnote to Table 5. 
The concentration analysis may be summarized as follows: 
- The Herfindahl index H is of the order of 36, suggesting a 
very high level of overall concentration, 
- Roche's market share is relatively high (58% in 1974), 
- The gap between Roche and the next largest firm is so great 
that the threshold value is k = k = 1, 
A ri 
- Market shares among the four largest firms are very unevenly 
distributed because of the high market share of the market 
leader.  L* works out at 14.9. 
1) The remaining market shares amounting to 19% are held by 
importers. 60 
- L* and LJ cannot be calculated.owing to a lack of further 
information. 
Roche's high market share (58% in 1974) and the low threshold 
value of k, = kTT = 1 indicate that Roche holds a dominant position. 
AH * 
(g) Decisions taken under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty: Result 
of examination 
The analysis of the principal Decisions taken under Article 86 
of the EEC Treaty has shown that the assessment criteria used by 
the Commission and the Court of Justice and the "measures of con-
centration for identifying concentration and critical concentra-
tion areas" proposed by us in Part II of this study all lead to 
largely the same conclusions for competition policy. Measures of 
concentration and of dominance therefore provide useful indices 
of whether or not a dominant position exists. These indices must 
then be scrutinized by applying a market structure and market 
conduct test so as to establish whether the threat to competition 
which they suggest does actually exist, especially since all 
values for the concentration indices usually depend on whether the 
relevant market is defined narrowly or broadly. 
2. Examination of various empirical studies on the evolution of 
concentration 
In the 1970s, the Commission of the European Communities had a 
series of studies carried out on the evolution of concentration 
in various industries. The measures of concentration and dominance 
proposed in Part II will be examined below in the light of some 
of these studies to see how useful they are in determining market 
power; the studies selected are those on the tyre, computer, 
ice-cream and coffee markets. 61 
(a) Study of the evolution of concentration in the tyre industry 
in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(1) Preliminary remarks 
In June 1975 the Commission asked the consultancy firm "Kienbaum 
Unternehmensberatung" to carry out an investigation into concen-
tration in the tyre industry. Since the information directly 
available was scant and imprecise, a small-scale survey was 
carried out among the tyre manufacturers in the Federal Republic 
of Germany using a questionnaire that asked for: 
- information on the firm; 
- figures (sales, employment, wages and salaries and gross invest-
ment) ; 
- supplementary details. 
In addition, five interviews were carried out with executives 
from: 
- Continental AG, Hannover, 
- Dunlop AG, Hanau, 
- Metzeier Kautschuk AG, Munich, 
- Phoenix AG, Hamburg, 
- Veith-Pirelli AG, Breuberg/Odenwald. 
Additional information was obtained from newspaper reports and 
other publications. 
(2) Definition of the relevant market 
The relevant product market was defined as the original equipment 
and replacement market in new tyres. Geographically, the study 
was confined to the Federal Republic of Germany. The statistics 
were completed in October 1976 and cover developments from 1968 
to 1975. 
The principal suppliers on the relevant product and geographic 
market were: 
1) Commission of the European Communities, "Untersuchung der Kon-
zentrationsentwicklung in der Reifenindustrie sowie ein 
Branchenbild der Kraftfahrzeug-Elektrikindustrie in Deutsch-
land", produced by Kienbaum Unternehmensberatung GmbH, Gummers-
bach. 
References to this study are made by indicating page numbers 











(3) Concentration and competition in the tyre industry 
The German tyre market may be described as an oligopoly; Michelin 
is in a relatively strong position with 23% of the market, followed 
by Continental with 18%. The other market shares range between 
2% and 11%. Imports by outsiders amounted to 12%. 
Despite the economic and financial strength of their parent com-
panies, by 1975 the American firms had not managed to achieve a 
pre-eminent position on the market, although, with the exception 
of Goodrich, they had been established in the Federal Republic 
for well over ten years. Towards the end of the period, powerful 
foreign groups such as Firestone, General Tyre, Semperit, Ceat, 
Vreedestein and Trellenbog, were entering the new tyre market as 
importers, providing serious competition for existing suppliers. 
Horizontal financial links were relatively few amongst the tyre 
manufacturers. In the case of vertical links, Continental stood 
out with holdings of up to 100% in numerous tyre distributors. 
Looking at the suppliers of the tyre manufacturers, the two joint 
ventures "Deutsche Gasrusswerke" and "Drahtcort Saar" had financial 63 
links with a number of tyre manufacturers. In 1974 the Bayer 
chemicals group acquired full ownership of Metzeler. 
As far as can be seen from the study, there was clearly 
effective competition on the German tyre market in the 1970s; 
this is indicated in particular by: 
- excess capacities in the face of stagnating demand, 
- relatively strong competition from outsiders and imports. 
In view of the influence of these conditioning factors, the 
oligopolistic structure must therefore be regarded as relatively 
loose. 
(4) Testing the measures of concentration and dominance pro-
posed in Part II: the tyre industry 
An analysis of the relevant market in new tyres by Kienbaum Unter-
nehmensberatung revealed the following individual market shares 























The remaining market shares were held by various tyre importers, 
and these "outsider imports" amounted to a total of 12%. 
The concentration analysis (see Table 12) may be summarized as 
follows : 
- The Herfindahl index H, at 12, indicates moderate concentration, 
- However, a look at the concentratition ratios shows that there 
is a relatively high level of overall concentration, with CR = 
61% and CR= 84%, 
o 
- Disparity is relatively small among the four largest firms, 
but more marked among the eight largest firms. 
Estimates. 64 


































* See footnote to Table 5. 
The threshold values of k = kr, 
A H 
2 and kT = 
L· 
show the partially 
oligopolistic structure of the market, though it is not possible 
to draw a clear dividing line between the oligopolistic group 
and the remaining group applying statistical procedures alone. 
The distribution of market shares would tend to suggest that 
kT = 8 is the most appropriate value. 
J_J 
The market may be described as a partial oligopoly with two or 
eight oligopolists whose market shares are relatively uniformly 
disturbed in the case of the group of two, but unevenly distri-
buted in the case of the group of eight. However, this analysis - 65 
is not sufficient for the purposes of assessing the competitive 
situation on the tyre market; other conditioning factors have to 
be taken into consideration. As a result it was found that, for 
the reasons stated in section (3), the tyre market in the 1970s 
was highly competitive. 
(b) Study of the evolution of concentration in the data-process-
ing industry (hardware) in the United Kingdom 
(1) Preliminary remarks 
At the Commission's request, Gareth Locksley of the Polytechnic 
of Central London carried out an investigation into the develop-
ment of concentration in the data-processing industry (hardware 
and software) in the United Kingdom in the period 1970-77. Since 
multinational enterprises play a key role in the data-processing 
industry, the study of the British industry was supplemented by 
international analyses focusing in particular on the markets in 
the United States and Western Europe. The data on individual 
firms were taken from their annual reports. Since almost all 
the firms refused to provide more detailed information, the sub-
division of the data-processing industry into the relevant sub-
markets was along very approximate lines. Locksley confines the 
breakdown to "hardware and related software" on the one hand, 
and "computer software and services" on the other. Only the first 
of these sectors will be looked at below. 
(2) Definition of the relevant market 
Because of the difficulties described, it was not possible to 
break the hardware market down into relevant sub-markets. "Hard-
ware and related software" therefore comprises the following 
groups : 
1) Commission of the European Communities, "A Study of the Evo-
lution of Concentration in the U.K. Data Processing Industry 
With Some International Comparisons", Evolution of Concentra-
tion and Competition Series: Collection: Working Papers, No. 
15, compiled by G. Locksley, Brussels 1980. 
References to this study are made by indicating page number 
in brackets. - 66 -
- mainframe computers 
- minicomputers 
- small business computers 
- peripherals (terminals, data collection equipment, printers, 
etc. ) 
- storage media. 
Table 13 shows the shares of the leading manufacturers in the 
value of all installed systems in three market areas (p. 100): 
Table 13: Percentage shares of the leading manufacturers 
(5% minimum share) in the value of all installed 















































Important strutural differences are evident here, though they 
cannot be ascertained quantitatively with the available material. 
Because the relevant product market is defined too broadly, actual 
concentration on the relevant markets for individual data-pro-
cessing products tends to be understated. 
The relevant geographic market is the United Kingdom. This 
delimitation seems justified despite the high degree of inter-
national integration since the large multinational firms have 67 -
British subsidiaries and since the market, like other national 
markets, is subject to government intervention. 
The investigations relate to the period 1970-77 and covered 
twenty-three undertakings (p. 99) : 
- Business Computers Ltd (withdrew from the market in 1972) 
- Burroughs 
- Commodore Business Machines 
- Computer Technology Ltd 
- Control Data 
- Data Dynamics 
- Data General (entered the market in 1971) 
- Data Recording Instruments Ltd (entered the market in 1971) 
- Digico Ltd 
- Digital Equipment Co 
- GEC Computers Ltd (entered the market in 1973) 
- Hewlett-Packard 
- Honeywell Information Systems 
- IBM 
- ICL 
- ITT Creed (entered the market in 1972) 
- Kalamazoo Ltd 
- Philips Data Systems (entered the market in 1971) 
- Prime Computers Ltd (entered the market in 1974) 
- NCR 
- Redifon (entered the market in 1972) 
- Sperry Rand Univac 
- Systime Ltd (entered the market in 1974). Table 14: Data processing (hardware and software) in the United Kingdom 
Market share structure (sales in %) 1970-77 . 





















































































































1)  The figures were kindly made available to us by Mr. Locksley via Directorate-General IV, 69 -
(3) Concentration and composition in the data-processing 
industry 
In the United Kingdom as elsewhere, the data-processing market 
is significantly influenced by IBM, which has a market share 
of some 40%. Thanks to government policy on data-processing, 
the British company ICL has a relatively strong counter-position 
with a market share of approximately 25%. The market can 
therefore be described as a duopoly with a residual group. Both 
ICL and IBM have diversified within the broad field of data-pro-
cessing and have significant holdings in the software sector in 
particular. 
The conduct of IBM's competitors is quite aggressive and compe-
titive (p. 6). However, IBM's dominant position is reflected 
in its market performance: economies of scale both in production 
and in marketing enable it to achieve distinctly higher profit-
sales ratios than ICL. 
Table 15: Profit-sales ratios of IBM and ICL in the United King-
dom, 1970-77 
(pre-tax profits/sales in %) 
Year 



















Despite limited comparability, particularly as regards the figures 
for profits, it is evident from Table 15 that IBM is distinctly 
more profitable than ICL. The fairly small fluctuations in market 
shares between 1970 and 1977 (see Table 14) indicate a low degree 
of dynamism and are a further indicator that effective competition 
is threatened. Table 16: Measures of concentration for the data-processing market (hardware and software) 






































































' Calculations by Locksley Qnd our own calculations. 


















































o - 71 
(4) Testing the measures of concentration and dominance proposed 
in Part II: the data-processing industry 
The measures of concentration put forward on page 41 are presented 
in Table 16 for the period 1970-77. The concentration analysis 
may be summarized as follows: 
- Overall concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index H, 
is very high at over 20 and fluctuates only slightly. The 
exponential index too is relatively high but is tending down-
wards owing to the stronger influence of small new entrants. 
- The concentration ratios also indicate a high degree of market 
concentration, with the importance of the four or eight largest 
firms decreasing slightly but still remaining very great with 
almost 80% or 90% market share. 
- The disparity among the four largest firms is considerable and 
shows a rising trend attributable primarily to the stronger 
growth of the two largest firms compared with the others. The 
disparity in the remaining group is very large and is due 
primarily to very small forms. 
- From 1971 onwards, the duopolistic structure of the market 





 2 · 
The market can therefore be described as a very tight partial 
duopoly (IBM and ICL) with some 20 smaller firms. Owing to the 
lack of a more detailed market breakdown, no conclusions can be 
drawn as to the importance of the small firms, e.g. on the market 
The determination of the minima of the Linda index curves 
differs from the calculations of Locksley, who does not in-
clude any boundary minima. His procedure results as a rule 
in induly large oligopolistic nuclei which do not properly 
reflect the existing duopolistic structure. 72 
for minicomputers. To this extent, the study makes clear the need 
need for an exact market definition if measures of concentration 
and dominance are to be meaningfully applied. 
(c) Study of the evolution of concentration in the ice-cream 
industry in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(1) Preliminary remarks 
As part of the programme of studies on the evolution of concen-
tration and competition in selected sectors and markets, the 
Commission asked the IFO Institute in Munich to carry out a 
study of the development of concentration in selected branches 
and product groups in the German food industry. The study, 
compiled by M. Breitenacher, included an investigation of the 
ice-cream industry in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The follow-up study which the Commission subsequently asked C. 
Marfels to carry out is a revised and updated version of the 
Breitenacher study. 
(2) Definition of the relevant market 
The ice-cream industry is part of the confectionary industry. 
Ice-cream is subdivided into three types: 
- proprietary brand ice-cream (industrially produced ice-cream), 
- non-industrial ice-cream, 
- soft ice-cream. 
Commission of the European Communities, "Untersuchung zur 
Konzentrationsentwicklung in ausgewählten Branchen und 
Produktgruppen der Ernährungsindustrie in Deutschland", com-
piled by M. Breitenacher, Brussels 1976, pp. 70 et seq. and 
82 et seq.; Commission of the European Communities, "A Study 
on Evolution of Concentration in the Food Industry of the 
Federal Republic of Germany", Evolution of Concentration and 
Competition Series: Collection: "Working Papers", No. 14, 
compiled by C. Marfels, Brussels, 1980, pp. 122-129. 
References to the Marfels study are made by indicating page 
numbers in brackets. - 73 -
The study on the development of concentration in selected branches 
dealt only with manufacturers of propriety brand ice-cream, prob-
ably accounting for some 70% of the total ice-cream market. 
The relevant geographic market was the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The main suppliers on the relevant market were: 
- Dr. Oetker Eiskrem GmbH 
- Langnese-Iglo GmbH 
- Milchhof/Moha Group 
- Milchwerke Wesermarsch eGmbH 
- Schöller Lebensmittel GmbH & Co. KG 
- Südmilch/Efa-Group 
- Warncke Eiskrem KG. 
(3) Concentration and competition in the ice-cream industry 
The ice-cream industry is the most highly concentrated part of 
the food industry. The high level of concentration results from 
a wave of mergers in the 1970s and the elimination of smaller 
producers from the ice-cream market. The two main mergers were: 
- Südmilch/Efa Eiskrem (1973) 
- Südmilch/Schöller (1978). 
The latter two had already been operating as a joint venture since 
1976. The number of suppliers fell on the relevant market from 
16 to 14. 
The German ice-cream market in 1977 may be described as a tight 
oligopoly with Langnese the market leader (44.7% market share). 
Langnese is owned by two financially powerful groups, Unilever 
(75%) and Nestle (25%). The three next largest suppliers, 
Schöller/Südmilch (30.5%), Dr. Oetker (9.1%) and Moha GmbH (4.8%) 
together have a smaller market than the market leader. 74 
(4) Testing the measures of concentration and dominance pro-
posed in Part II: the ice-cream industry 
An analysis of the relevant market in ice-cream revealed the 
following individual market shares (= p; in %): 
Table 17: Market share structure on the ice-cream market in 





















































The concentration analysis (see Table 18) may be summarized as 
follows : 
- The values of the Herfindahl index H, ranging between 25 and 
31 over time, indicate a very high level of concentration. 
- The concentration ratios are also very high. CR., at almost 
50% points to the existence of a market leader, with the 
second largest firm having come relatively close to the market 
leader in 19 77. The share of the four largest firms rose 
from some 80% to 90% by 1977. Table 18: Measures of concentration* for the ice-cream industry 1970-77 
(Variable: sales)  1) 
^""■"""—^^^ Year 
Indices '—~^__^ 
Summary measures H 
of concentration F  (xlOO) 
Concentration CR. 










28.1 - 28.5 
16,5 - 18.9 
48.3 
79.4 






25.7 - 25.8 
16.3 - 17.4 
45,3 
81 .1 






28.1 - 28.2 
19,4 - 20.9 
46.5 
86.9 






30.6 - 30.8 
21.4 - 23,7 
44.7 
89,1 





See footnote to Table 5. 
1) The figures given by Marfels (p. 28) substantially overestimate the Herfindahl 
and exponential indices. 
υπ 76 -
- The disparity among the four largest firms is relatively high, 
as L* shows. 
- The threshold values of k. and k demonstrate the existence over 
time of a dominant single firm and dominant duopolistic group. 
The market in industrially manufactured ice-cream is one of the 
most highly concentrated markets in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
However, in contrast to the two previous market studies, the 
purely quantitative figures do not allow any conclusion to be drawn 
as to whether the market is characterized by effective competition 
or by an actual restriction of competition. 
(d) Study of the evolution of concentration in the coffee market 
in the Federal Republic of Germany 
(1) Preliminary remarks 
As part of the programme of studies on the evolution of concen-
tration and competition in selected sectors and branches, the 
Commission asked Christian Marfels„ Professor at Dalhousie Uni-
versity in Canada, to carry out a study of the development of con-
centration in selected branches and product groups in the German 
food industry. The study included an investigation of the coffee 
market in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
(2) Definition of the relevant market 
Coffee is part of the "coffee and tea" branch of the food 
industry, and the coffee market may be divided into three sub-
markets with the following shares in 1977: 
1) Commission of the European Communities, "A Study on Evolution 
of Concentration in the Food Industry of the Federal Republic 
of Germany", Evolution of Concentration and Competition Series: 
Collection: "Working Papers", No. 14, compiled by C. Marfels, 
Brussels 1980, pp. 175-191. 
References to this study are made by indicating page numbers 
in brackets. - 77 
- roast coffee (85.1%) 
- instant coffee (13.6%) 
- coffee surrogates (1.3%). 
In the Marfels study, the relevant product market comprises all 
the product types whose raw material basis is coffee. These 
include: 
- roast coffee 
- instant coffee 
with the study assuming that the substitution relationships 
between the two are so close that they must be regarded as 
serving the same market. 
The study, which is based on figures for the period from 1970 to 
1977, focuses on the Federal Republic of Germany as the relevant 
geographic market. The main suppliers on the relevant market 
were: 
- Albrecht 
- A. Dallmayr 
- J.J. Darboven 
- Deutsche Nestle GmbH 
- Eduscho E. Schopf GmbH & Co. KG 
- General Foods GmbH 
- Hag AG 
- J. Jacobs & Co. KG 
- Melitta-Werke Bentz & Sohn 
- Tchibo Frisch-Röst-Kaffee Max Herz KG. 
(3) Concentration and competition in the coffee processing 
industry 
The ranking of the leading coffee processors remained unchanged 
during the period from 1970 (Jacobs, Tchibo, Eduscho, Kaffee Hag) 
The market share of the three largest firms on the overall coffee 
market (roast coffee and instant coffee) fell from 55% in 1970 
to 44% in 1977. By contrast, these three firms increased their 
share on the roast coffee sub-market during the same period from 
52% to 55%. 
During the period 1970-77, Jacobs, the market leader, had only 
a slight lead over Tchibo, the next largest firm. 78 
Jacobs is the only firm that was strong, both on the roast 
coffee market and on the instant coffee market (21% and 22% 
market shares respectively in 1977). Nestle and General Foods 
operate on the instant coffee market only (with market shares 
of 40% and 10% respectively in 1977). The market leader in 
instant coffee is Nestle. The market share of the three largest 
suppliers of instant coffee (Nestle, Jacobs and General Foods) 
rose from 63% in 1970 to 73% in 1977. 
The most important event for the coffee processing industry was 
the abolition of resale price maintenance in 1973. Strong com-
petition among coffee processors and the sale of leading brands 
through discount stores boosted coffee consumption, but at the 
same time resulted in a decimation of producers. 
Horizontal links are not of major importance on the coffee market, 
but vertical integration in the case of the three largest suppliers 
is at a relatively advanced stage: Jacobs has a fleet of some 
1.3000 vehicles supplying supermarkets and discount stores. 
Tchibo has more than 500 special Tchibo coffee shops and sells 
about 50% of its coffee through these. Eduscho has at present 
about 460 Eduscho coffee shops in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
In sales of decaffeinated coffee, Kaffee Hag is the market leader 
with a market share of 56% in 1977. Since 1979, 95.5% of its 
shares have been held by General Foods. 
(4) Testing the measures of concentration and dominance pro-
posed in Part II: the coffee processing industry 
An analysis of the relevant market in coffee revealed the follow-
ing individual market shares (= p; in %) : - 79 -
Table 19: Market share structure on the coffee market in the 





























































The concentration analysis (see Table 20) may be summarized as 
follows (p. 190): 
- The values of the Herfindahl index H, ranging between 8 and 13, 
point to moderate concentration. 
- The concentration ratios for CR. and CR„ indicate an oligopoly, 
especially since CR., is not particularly great. Both the Her-
findahl index and the concentration ratios show a distinctly 
downward trend over time. 
- The measures of dispaity L* and L* similarly show a slightly 
falling trend over time, indicating increasing symmetry in the 
oligopolistic group. Table 20: Measures of concentration for the coffee processing industry 1970-77 
(variable: sales) 
*""" Year 
Indices """ ~-»^__^ 
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o - 81 -
- The threshold values range between 2 and 6, indicating a tight 
oligopoly with a duopolistic nucleus. 
Though the concentration ratios of CR4 = 52.1% and CR = 68.1% 
in 1977 are relatively high, the market considered as a whole was 
competitive. This is indicated by the substantial loss of market 
shares by the leading firms and the increasing importance of the 
other firms. A look at the two sub-markets shows: 
- a virtually unchanged level of concentration in the roast 
coffee market and 
- a sharp increase in concentration in the instant coffee market. 
These differences of development provide further evidence of the 
need for an exact definition of the relevant market. - 82 -
Summary and conclusions for Community competition policy 
1. Summary of reflections on competition theory and competition 
policy 
Effective competition is determined by the characteristics of 
market structure, market conduct and market performance. The 
approach that has come to be adopted in US, German and Community 
competition policy in assessing the competition process is to 
apply a combination of structural and behavioural criteria; in 
so doing, greater emphasis is placed on the structural approach 
(e.g. for merger control) or on the behavioural approach (e.g. 
in dealing with predatory pricing or refusal to sell), depending 
on the rationale of the individual legal provision concerned. 
Under the structural approach, particular importance attaches 
to the number of suppliers and to the size distribution of market 
shares. This market structure aspect is determined quantitatively 
by measuring the level of concentration. 
The intensity of competition also depends on a fairly large number 
of conditioning factors and on actual market conduct. Analysis 
of the links between the morphological factor and intensity of 
competition is justified firstly by the particular importance 
and weight of the morphological factor in the market structure 
test (justification from the competition theory angle) and 
secondly by considerations regarding its operational and justi-
ciable aspects (justification from the competition policy angle). 
In price and competition theory, the significance of a rise in 
the level of concentration lies in the danger of an increasing 
symmetry of interests. Empirical studies and theoretical 
analysis reveal that beyond a specified level of concentration, 
it is possible and advantageous for the leading firms to pursue 
joint profit maximization rather than individual profit maximi-
zation as usually assumed in price theory. There is therefore - 83 
the danger that, above the specified level of concentration, 
firms may change their objectives and pursue a collective pricing 
policy on the basis of a quasi-agreement involving either con-
tract-like obligations falling within Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 
or de facto parallel conduct based on group discipline or price 
leadership falling within Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. The 
market performance resulting from such conduct is no longer com-
petitive. 
Any further rise in the level of concentration creates a dominant 
position for a single firm which has wide room for manoeuvre vis-
a-vis its competitors and is no longer controlled by effective 
competition, the ultimate stage being partial monopoly or full 
monopoly. 
However, the main problem for competition policy today is not 
dominant positions held by individual firms, but those held by 
groups of firms which jointly control the market. 
These price and competition theory notions, whereby a growth in 
concentration is seen as a threat to competition, have been 
examined empirically in a number of investigations (e.g. by Bain, 
Mann and Weiss); these showed the critical thresholds to be CR. = 
50% and CRg = 70%. In view of the influence of the other condi-
tioning factors, the critical level of concentration on individual 
markets does of course vary upwards or downwards, indicating that 
D On joint profit maximization objectives with joint pricing 
policies, see in particular William FELLNER, "Competition 
Among the Few", New York 1949. According to this concept, 
oligopolists try to maximize profits jointly by setting a 
(joint) "monopoly price" and jointly selling the "monopoly 
puantity". The joint profits to be shared out amongst the · 
individual oligopolists (distribution problem) is greater 
than the sum of individual profits in the case of individual 
profit maximization. 84 
there is no exact link between market performance and concentra-
tion. Consequently, the only link that can be said to exist between 
the level of concentration and the effectiveness of competition 
is that competition is threatened as concentration increases. 
This formulation also covers the possibility of distortion in 
individual cases and focuses only on typical links, which in addi-
tion vary with the branch structure. 
In attempting, on the sole basis of the size distribution of market 
shares, to find adeguate measures of concentration for the purposes 
of identifying market structures that threaten competition, the 
following points are of importance: 
- The measures of concentration used should have generally recog-
nized properties; thus, for example, the level of concentration 
identified should rise where mergers occur and where the market 
share of a large firm increases at the expense of a smaller firm. 
However, in certain areas (e.g. transformation of an oligopoly 
that tends to be asymmetrical into a symmetrical oligopoly with 
spontaneously-coordinated conduct), it must be supposed that 
competition intensifies as the level of concentration rises; use 
of the concept of concentration is to that extent neutral as 
regards competition. 
- Particular importance must be attached to the largest firms 
in determining overall concentration in a market; it is for 
this reason that the Herfindahl index is proposed. 
- Measures of dominance must be used to distinguish any nucleus 
of dominant firms from other firms so as to capture any oligo-
polistic or partially monopolistic structures. 
- Where the concept of individual power is applied, indications 
must be given of the market share of the largest firm and the 
gap between it and the market share of the other firms as well 
as the degree of unevenness in the distribution of market 
shares (disparity). 
- Where the group power concept is applied, the market share of 
the nucleus group or of the four and eight largest firms must 
be indicated; in addition, the degree of unevenness in the 
market shares of these firms and the gap between them and the 
market shares of the other firms not belonging to the nucleus - 85 
group must be determined plus the degree of unevenness in the 
market shares of such other firms (disparity). 
For the purposes of ascertaining and defining critical market 
structures, therefore, the following statistical characteristics 
should be determined under the Commission's existing programme 
of concentration analyses: 
Indices 
Summary measures of 
concentration 
Herfindahl index H (xlOO) 
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The Herfindahl index indicates the overall concentration of 
the market investigated; here, a value of 10, which means an 
oligopoly with ten suppliers of equal size, is to be regarded 
as critical. 
To establish the importance of the one, four and eight largest 
firms, the relevant concentration ratios are given; critical 
values here are 35%, 50% and 70%. 86 
- The unevenness of market share distribution among the largest 
firms may be assessed with the help of the mean dominance indices 
L* and L*. Low values here indicate symmetry of interests, 
4 o 
while very high values indicate clear dominance by individual 
firms. Both these situations are undesirable from a competition 
policy point of view. However, it is difficult to specify exact 
figures for the critical areas. If all the market shares are 
known, the mean dominance for the remaining group L* may also 
be shown. 
- Threshold values of 10 or less suggest, in the case of a high 
level of concentration, that oligopolistic nuclei may be distin-
guished. Where an oligopolistic group may be clearly identified, 
the relevant market share and the mean dominance in the nucleus 
may also be indicated. 
2. Early detection of structures that threaten competition 
(a) Market structure and market phase 
In ascertaining whether or not structures exist that threaten 
competition, reference must be made to the market in the expan-
sionary phase, since there may still be effective competition 
during such a phase even in a duopolistic situation; in the long 
run, all markets as a rule enter a phase of stagnation or con-
traction in which the number of suppliers (morphology) takes on 
1)  greater importance. 
Consequently, policy on concentration should, as part of long-
term regulatory policy, focus on that number of firms which 
experience shows to be the minimum necessary on stagnating markets 
in order to maintain effective competition. Otherwise, it would 
be necessary to split up firms during the stagnation phase in the 
interests of restoring the morphological conditions for effective 
competition. 
On the links between competition and market phase, see Ernst 
HEUSS, "Allgemeine Markttheorie", Tübingen, 1965. 87 -
(b) Competition policy must seek to prevent concentration from 
reaching a critical level 
In addition, concentration must be prevented in good time from 
reaching the critical level so as not to jeopardize the effetive-
ness of competition. A concentration policy that allows mergers 
to take place up to the threshold of market dominance within the 
meaning of Section 22 of the German Act against Restraints of 
Competition or of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty falls short on 
competition policy grounds, since the slightest change in market 
structure (e.g. through disproportionately strong internal growth 
or a change of market phase) would tip the balance, transforming 
a market structure that was still just about competitive into one 
that was no longer competitive 
3. To what extent does a high level of concentration indicate 
restriction of competition? 
On the question of whether and to what extent a high level of 
concentration indicates restriction of competition, empirical 
studies permit the following conclusions: 
- Measures of concentration and dominance are fairly indicative 
where there is a single dominant firm (individual power con-
cept) . If a firm has, for example, a 40% market share and 
the next largest a significantly smaller market share, reflected 
in a threshold value of 1, a dominant position is highly prob-
able. 
D BARTLING, op. cit., p. 84: "The fact that (applying the 
market dominance criterion as defined in Section 22 of the 
German Act against Restraints of Competition) mergers may be 
prohibited at much too late a stage becomes apparent if, on 
the basis of statutory criteria for presuming dominance one 
calculates the number to which competitors may without 
hindrance be reduced through mergers. Market dominance is 
presumed under Section 22(3) of the German Act against Re-
Restraints of Competition where a single firm has a market 
share of one third or more, or three firms have a combined 
market share of 50% or more, or five firms have a combined 
market share of two thirds or more. This means that, through 
mergers, a market share of up to two thirds could be concen-
trated on the five largest firms, and the remaining third 
could be shared amongst another three firms, with the result 
that the number of firms could be reduced to eight without 
any measures having to be taken to prevent such concentration 
under present merger control arrangements. It is obvious 
that, where there are only eight firms, learning processes 
easily occur in the competition area which ultimately lead to 
parallel conduct based on spontaneous coordination". 88 
- However, measures of concentration and dominance are obviously 
less indicative in the case of oligopolistic groups, since the 
influence of the other conditioning factors is greater than in 
the case of a single dominant firm: competition is less likely 
to be threatened in such market structures (cf. the empirical 
analysis of the tyre and coffee markets where, despite high 
values for the concentration ratio and. Herfindahl index, sub-
stantial competition existed. 
4. Recommendations for Community competition policy 
In the light of the investigation carried out in Part III into 
the suitability of measures of concentration and dominance for 
competition policy purposes, it would seem advisable for hori-
zontal mergers within the European Community to be assessed as 
follows : 
(a) It should be possible to prohibit mergers where there is a 
threat of a substantial impairment of effective competition 
within the common market or in a substantial part of it. 
(b) In accordance with the conclusions of Part III of the study, 
the threat of a substantial impairment of effective competition 
could be defined as regards its operational and justiciable 
aspects using measures of concentration and dominance. 
A threat of a substantial impairment of effective competition 
should be assumed where: 
(1) a firm acquires through a merger a market share of one 
third or more and 
(2) the next largest firm has less than a quarter of the market 
share of the leading firm, or where: 89 -
(3) the group comprising the four largest firms acquires through 
a merger a market share of 50% or more or 
(4) the group comprising the eight ]argest firms acquires through 
a merger a market share of 70% or more. 
In cases (3) and (4), account must be taken of any oligopolistic 
nuclei revealed using measures of dominance; i.e. the oligopolistic 
nucleus may vary in tightness or looseness from case to case. 
The following in particular are arguments for using rebuttable 
legal presumptions based on measures of concentration and dominance: 
- In view of the difficulties in defining the relevant product 
market, use of measures of concentration and dominance involves 
uncertainties. 
- The influence of the other conditioning factors may be so strong 
as to ensure effective competition despite a high level of con-
centration. 
The level at which the critical measures of concentration and 
dominance are set should depend on whether the relevant geographic 
market is to be the whole of the common market or only a substan-
tial part of it; that is to say, the wider the definition of the 
relevant geographic market, the lower the relevant critical values 
selected may be. 
(c) In the interests of legal certainty, the obligation to notify 
mergers should be based on absolute criteria. Under this obliga-
tion, firms would have to provide information on their own market 
positions, allowing the Commission to decide whether or not there 
was a danger of a substantial impairment of effective competition. 90 
Annex: Formulae used in the statistical measurement of concentration 

























































Size distribution of all market shares: 
ρ = (Pl,p2...,pn) 
Size distribution of the market shares of the m largest firms: 
Uniform distribution: 







ρ = (1,0,...,0) 
Measure of concentration: K(p,n) 
Measure of disparity: D(p,n) 
(1) Κ = K(D,n) 
Disparity effect: 
Number effect: ¿κ 
Δη 
Lorenz curve: 
(2) H. = i' »- L. = f ρ ., , Η_ = L_ = O 






(3) i ►- C. = Τ ρ 
v=1 91 
Relationship between Lorenz curve and concentration curve: 




2. Properties of concentration measures 
According to JOHNK (1970) , measures of concentration and dis­
parity can be described by reference to a few characteristic 
properties. 
(5) O < K, D < 1 
Principle of transfers: 
Transfer vector Δ =(0,...,+ε,...,—ε/.··#0) 
(6) Κίρ+Δ)^ Κ(ρ) , ϋ(ρ+Δ)>< D(p) for
 ε><
0 
In addition to this strong principle of transfers, a weak 
principle of transfers (with equal-signs) is also considered. 
?E2P2Eïi2D5iitY_ÏÉ?Ë_ ^EPìiSE5ì2Eli. 









(c~ ' ■ * * ' c~ ' ' c ' * * * c ' 
(7) K(pc) = -\ Κ(ρ) , D(pc) = D(ρ) 
Supplementary_test: 
Size distribution in the case of addition - incorporation of 
(c-l)n zero-size units. 
(8) K(pe) = K(p) , D(pe) = 1 -¿[1-D(p)] . 
Measures which display these four properties and are continuous 
in ρ are referred to as: 
Uniformly standardized measures : 
Symmetry is achieved by introducing a measure of eguality 
(9) G(p) = 1 - D(p) 92 -
Proportionality test and supplementary test: 
(10) 
K(pc)= ¿ K(p) 
K(pe)= K(p) 
G(pc) = G(p) 
G(pe) = ~ G(p) 
The following in par-
ticular applies for 
= : K(pc) -<■ O , G(pe) 





(12)  K = nG n(1-D) 
Disparity effect and number effect: 
1 ._ 1 
(13)  ΔΚ Hi  AD 
n(1-D)  n^(1-D) 
Δη 





(15)  — < κ < 1 
η 
Ο < D < 1 -
"Numbers Equivalent" = minimum number of units; equal distri-
bution yields a value of concentration K. 
(16)  „ il 
Impact of mergers: 
(17)  Κ > Κ 
< 
D- > D 
Geometrical interpretation of the properties of uniformly 
standardized measures: 93 
I* 





Fig. 4 Disparity (and parity) and concentration in the case of 
uniformly standardized measures - Graphical interpreta­
tion of effects 
3. Special concentration measures 
Summary measures: all p. or C. are included in the calcu­
lation of K. 
Point measures = discrete measures ; only some p. or C. are 
used in calculating K. 
3.1 Measures derived direct from the concentration curve 
Concentrâtion_ratio¿ 
(18) CR. = C. 
11 




P1+..,+ρ±  1 x-+...+x. 
C. is the average market share of the large firms or mean value 
for the large firms divided by X. 
D In the case of concentration ratios, the double notation C. 
(ordinate of the concentration curve) = CR. (concentra-94 -





ki k-i k-i k k-i ι χ k-i 
Applied 
using: k = η i.e. C. = 1 , k = m or k > i. 
Interpreted as average market share of small firms or mean 
value of small firms. 
Marginal concentration ratio: 
(21) AC. = p. 
1 *1 
3.2 Some uniformly standardized measures of concentration 
?5?2EEìi52É_52E
findahl index H : 
(22) (Η )
α"






(23) H = H = ? p
 





where V = — is the coefficient of variation. 
Exgonential-Index (α=1): 
η P± 




n be related to the comprehensive concept of the 
quasi-linear mean, which is used in measuring dis-
parity and concentration. A quasi-linear mean 
η 










Κ = Η  α 
All Η at measures are closely related to the entropy of 
















(25)  „ 1Γ= ? 
»3 ■ ;¡ J, % 
Increasing of Η (mean value disparity) 
(26) 
Rosenbluth index: 
- < E < H2 < H3 < P1 
(27)  RB =  1  1 
2A n(1-R) 
An area above the concentration curve and 
Gini_coefficient jmeasure of disparity): 
η 




R can be interpreted as double the area between the Lorenz 
curve and the line bisecting the angle. 
Table 3: Uniformly standardized counterpart measures of 






Standardized square of co-







Schutz coefficient (measure of disparity): 
(29)  S = Ι , (P±- i> <- R 
*i -n 
Interpreted as the longest Lorenz curve chord. 
With two-poirrt distribution, S = R. Weak principle of 
transfers. 96 
3.3 Hybrid measures 
Combination of uniformly standardized measures: 
D = aD1 + d-a)D2 0<o<1 
(30) ( κ = 
Horvath index: 





(31) CI = Ρι + Ι Pj, [1+d-Pj)] 
' i=1 




4. Problems of aggregation 
Aggregation of industry data (e.g. for countries) to obtain 
overall results (e.g. for the EEC) 
i5Éy5EEÉ2Ë_iz2:i_i.üi._]S_l 
Values of variable: (in industry j):X.. i= l,...,n. -
ij J 
classified in descending order of size. 
Total value in industry n-; 
X . = Y x.. =n.u. 
3 i=1 ±3 J 3 
















Market shares in industry j: 
η .  χ. . j 
p. .* = rrÜ p..* = 1 
Pi3 Xj ¿fx3 
Measure of concentration κ 
j 
Measure of disparity: p. - 97 -
Aggregate : 
Notation as before  (p., n, K, D) 
(33) K < Max K. 
(34) D > Min D. 
j
 3 
, K < Min K. possible 
, D > Max D. possible 
Values of k 
C Min K.  Max K. 
-^ Values of D 
-*-
















CR. . = C. . (i=1». ^jj concentration ratio in the jth 




Χ.  J. 
'ij Χ 
with 
C. = CR.  ι ι 
classified in descending order of 
size: p. (i=1,..,n) 








(e.g. Gini coefficient R) 
1, 











(36) H = Y (3^) H 
3=1 
Aggregation of exponential indices: 
(37) 
k Ρ· k Pj 
E = E n E.
 
3 with Eo - Π Pj 
°j=1 3 D-i - 98 -
Taking mergers into account in the event of aggregation 
Merger of the k th and 1 th units 
Herfindahl_index£ 















5. Measures of dominance 
5. 1 Calculating measures of dominance where the entire concen-
tration curve is given (fixed horizon n) 
Slope index D : 
χ. AC. A A 
(40) D











Δι+1 i=1,..,n A 
5 
Longest_concentrâtion_curve_chord_D_2_ 
(41) D? = C - i , Max υ\ = DJ[ 
1 in 1=1,..,n S 
xj 
Herfindahl measure of dominance_D_£ 
Maximum value of the Herfindahl index for two groups of i 
equally large firms and η-i equally small firms. 
„ C.
2 (1-C.)
2 H H 









Linda measure of dominance D : 
C. h-i η Q 









N.B. The slope index can be understood intuitively and should 
be the first index used for obtaining rough information. 
TT C 




pond in a relatively sensitive manner; several cut-off 





tg α = CT 
Λ 2. 
Fig. 6: 
■*%.  rv 
.A  On the interpretation of the measures of dominance D = tg Τ , 







u tg β 
.A. 
5.2 Calculating measures of dominance with incomplete statistical 
data (values of variable for the large firms - moving horizons) 
Longest concentration curve chord. D 
im 




+xi _ i 
im χ.+..+x m 
1 m 










i=1 , . . ,m S 
m -*■ n 
ks (m) -100-
Herfindahl measure of dominance D  H 
2 , 2 
χ.+..+X. 1 Χ. ,+.·+Χ 
D« = 1 ( -J i ) + -^ ( -ilî 5 ) 















m  ,Η _ ^Η 
i=1 ,..,m ν = 1 'Η 
(47) Max y χ D. = D, . . -„,..., -Η  L ν im k„ (m) H H 
m -*■ n 
k„(m) k. 
Linda measure of dominance D. : 
im 
(48) D 
Q i m-i 
im i C -C. 
m ι 






m ·-»■ η 
(49) Max D- = D- , k (m) kç 
i=1, . - ,m Q 
6. Linda indices 
Upper mean value: 
_ x,+..+x. 












Mk = k-i 
i+1 K Kl 
Possible options: k=n, k=m, or k= any number<η, 
















N.B. "Ratio of oligopolistic dominance" (Linda) 
.DO. .  ι k-i - 101 
Mean dominance (simple arithmetic Linda index) 
(53) L* -j^Y V.k k = 2,3, 
Range of values: 
(54) 1 < L* < » 
Relative mean dominance (double averaged Linda index) 
k-1  1 1 _ 
ι 
i = 1  <
55>
 
Lk = k-k^T .L
 
Vik k = 2,3,.. 
Range of values: 
(56) 1 < Lk < co 
(57) L* = kLk 
Relationship with concentration ratios and average concen-
tration ratios: 




Lk = k^r .1 
■ « Ρ- Λ
 
+ - - ·+Ρι ! 
1=1 *ι+1 *κ 
1 k-1 C. k-i 1 k-i C7 
^ Ji ST^^"
 
= ^ Jl οτΞ 
C.  k χ 
L, used as inverse measure of dominance for detecting oligo-
polistic nuclei: 
Moving horizons k: 
kT is the position of the first minimum value of relative 
mean dominance L. . Linda also interprets other relative 
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For this purpose the significance of the relation between degree of concentration 
and effectiveness of competition is first of all examined within the context of dif-
ferent theoretical concepts relating to competition. Certain measures of concentra-
tion and dominance are then described and their properties are illustrated in detail 
by means of model calculations. The third part considers, in the light of certain 
actual cases, whether the proposed measures of concentration and dominance are 
applicable to competition policy. Finally, the ensuing results are comprised in 
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